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INTRODUCTION
Since 1993, abortion-related violence has been increasingly in the
news.' Patients, abortion protesters, and pro-choice groups all have
been affected, but the doctors who perform abortions have most
recently been the target of much of the and-abortion violence. In
an effort to make abortions unavailable, many pro-life groups have
resorted to exposure campaigns aimed at disclosing to the general
public the names of doctors who perform abortions.' Fearing such
exposure will- cost them their lives, many doctors are taking radical
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1. MorningEdition (NPR radio broadcast, Feb. 3,1995) (1995 WL 2957329). "The statistics
are only too familiar;, five murders at clinics in less than two years, 400 death threats in 1994
alone. In the last dozen years, according to the Bureau of.Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms, there
have been 37 bombings in 33 states, 123 cases of arson, 1,500 cases of assault, stalking, sabotage,
and burglary, and some $13 million in property damage." Id
2. See William Booth, Abortion Battle Fatigue; Slain Physician's Replacement Vents Fears,
Frustration, WASH. POST, May 7, 1993, at A3 (recounting the concerns and precautions that
physicians take due to increased harassment by pro-life activists and the shooting death of Dr.
David Gunn in Pensacola, Florida in March of 1993 by Michael Griffin); Lynne Bumpus-Hooper,
Abortion Providers Seek More Protection, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 19, 1993, at B1 (discussing the
effects of anti-abortion protestor tactics, which include protesting at clinics and doctors' homes
and making intimidation and fear an every day aspect of doctors' lives). One doctor was quoted
as saying "I don't believe as a physician I should have to wear a bullet-proof vest...." Id. See
also WeekendEdition-Saturday (NPRradio broadcast,Jan. 21,1995) (1995WL 2880295) (discussing
the American Coalition of Life Activists' (ACLA) creation of a list of doctors, "abortionists," the
group plans to expose by using wanted posters and harassment techniques).
3. SeeTimothy Egan, The Roots ofTerror-A Special Report, N.Y. TiMs,June 18, 1995, at 1:1
(describing the ACLA's compilation of a list of doctors they called the "deadly dozen" and
targeted for exposure and harassment). See also infra Section I (summarizing pro-life groups'
new exposure techniques).
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safety precautions like constantly wearing bullet-proof vests. 4 Some
doctors, however, have abandoned their medical practice or simply
left the field because they do not want to subject their families to a
barrage of harassment, threats, and the very real possibility of
violence.' Unfortunately, state and federal criminal penalties offer
little in terms of deterring the violence and harassment against
doctors.6
This article suggests that an effective preventative measure against
the harassment of doctors is the vigorous pursuit of civil actions
focused on one or more of the various privacy torts. Depending on
the type of harassment, doctors could bring suit against their harassers
based upon the intrusion upon seclusion tort,7 the false light tort,8
and/or the public disclosure of private facts tort9 This article briefly
4. See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 11, 1994) (1994 WL 8690168)
(interviewing a targeted doctor who wears a military helmet and bullet-proof vest to work and
would only consent to a telephone interview due to safety concerns); Sara Rimer, Abortion Clinics
Seek Doctors but Find Few, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1993, atA14 (citing a director ofa women's health
clinic who ordered bullet-proof vests for all of the doctors at her clinics due to the increase in
hate mail, death threats, and wanted posters).
5. See, eg., ABC World News Tonight: American Agenda Targeting Doctors Wbo Do Abortions
(ABC television broadcast, Mar. 28, 1995) (noting that exposure campaigns have the greatest
effect on doctors who perform abortions as only a small portion of their practice by forcing
them to stop performing abortions and leave town); Abortionist Shooting Spurs Another to Quit, LIFE
ADVOC., Nov. 1994 at 28 (recounting the experiences of a doctor who is a self-proclaimed "thrill-
seeker" but quit performing abortions saying he would rather die sky-diving); Booth, supra, note
2, atA3 ("Fewer physicians are willing to endure what they call constant harassment and threats
byan increasinglysophisticated anti-abortion movement."); TheMacidei lLehrerNewshour. Abortion
Battles (PBS television broadcast, June 5, 1995) (linking the ACLA's exposure campaign against
12 Oregon doctors to an Oregon Health Department report that the number of abortion
providers in Oregon has dropped from 59 to 48 since 1992).
6. See SpecialHeaing on Vi'oence at Women's Health Clinics Btfore the Subcomm. on Labor, Health
and Human Sers. and Educ. and Related Agencies of the Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) (statement of Katherine Spillar, National Coordinator Feminist Majority
Foundation) (testifying that despite the efforts of state and federal law enforcement, in the first
seven months of 1994, 52% of clinics surveyed experienced "one or more types of violence,
including death threats, stalkings, bombings, invasions, arsons, and blockades"). See also infra
Section II (discussing how current laws offer doctors little help).
7. See W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON, DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER &
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 117, at 854 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]
(explaining that the primary elements of the intrusion upon seclusion tort are an unreasonable
and intentional intrusion, physical or otherwise, into the solitude or seclusion of another's
personal or private affairs).
8. See id. at 863 (defining the false light tort as an intentional invasion of privacy that
violates a person's right to be "let alone" with a highly offensive form of publicity that would be
objectionable to a reasonable person).
9. See id- at 856 (noting that even though the information may be true, an action lies for
highly objectionable public disclosure of private information that would offend a reasonable
person. However, merely including a fact in a public record does not automatically make it a
public concern.).
There is another type of privacy tort that deals with likeness for financial reasons or
appropriation, but that tort would not be implicated in this type of situation because the
exposure tactics of the anti-abortion protestors are generally not for personal financial gain. See
id at 851 (noting that the courts first recognized the appropriation form of invasion of privacy,
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discusses the first two torts, but focuses primarily on a doctor's
potential use of the public disclosure of private facts tort to sue
individuals and groups participating in exposure campaigns. Section
I presents how abortion opponents target doctors and describes the
various methods of current exposure campaigns. Section II examines
why many within the anti-abortion movement are targeting doctors for
harassment and analyzes how the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (FACE) 10 has failed to offer adequate protection for
doctors." Finally, Section III explores the potential legal remedies
behind the privacy torts. This article concludes that although some
of the information about doctors used in exposure campaigns are
matters of public record, doctors should be afforded the protection
of the privacy torts to ensure the availability of abortion and preserve
reproductive freedom. By protecting doctors' safety and privacy we
can protect the basic privacy rights of all citizens.
I: How ARE ABORTION OPPONENTS TARGETING DOCTORS-
WHAT Is THEIR NEW STRATEGY?
Although numerous books and articles set forth new plans to target
doctors who perform abortions,12 this article briefly describes the
tactics addressed in three major pro-life works:" Abortion Buster's
a tort which involves the appropriation of the name or likeness of the plaintiff for the
defendant's own advantage or benefit).
10. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248 (West Supp. 1995) (establishing criminal and civil penalties for use
against anti-abortion protestors who block access to women's health clinics).
11. Peter Eisler, Abortion Protiders Say New Law Does Not Protect Them, GANNETT NEWS SERV.,
Sept. 22, 1994 (quoting the Director of the Ladies Center of Pensacola, a health clinic which
provides abortion services and employed Dr.John Britton, as stating that six weeks prior to Paul
Hill's shooting of Dr. Britton and his escort, James Barrett, she tried, unsuccessfully, to get local
and federal law enforcement officials to enforce FACE against Paul Hill for his disruptive
behavior).
12. See, e.g., Laura Griffin, Violence in the Name of God, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994
at Al (reviewing the rise in anti-abortion violence since abortion was legalized and the role of
publications like Joseph Scheidler's, CLOSED: 99 WAYS TO STOP ABORTION (1985), which
advocates technically "nonviolent" methods of closing abortion clinics and manuals published
by the Army of God which instruct readers on how to build bombs, set fires and plan butyric
acid attacks on abortion clinics); N.Y. Times News Service, Free Speech or Incitement to Violence
DALLAS MORN. NEwvs,Jan. 15, 1995 atA9 (examining pro-life publications like, CONFESSIONS OF
A PRO-LIFE MISSIONARY, by Father Paul Marx, founder of Human Life International, which
includes a chapter entitled "Pro-Abortion Jews and the New Holocaust"); Colleen O'Connor,
Abortion Clinics Face Increase in Vwlene Militants Say Scripture Backs Them, DALLAS MORN. NEws,Jan.
30, 1994, atAl (discussing the growing tendency of pro-life organizations to center on violence,
citing THE CAPITOL AREA CHRISTIAN NEWS as a pro-life newsletter advocating anti-abortion
violence, including attacking "Planned Barrenhood (sic)" offices with stink bombs and gunfire).
13. These three texts were chosen because they provide the basic strategies currently being
used by pro-life activists involved in exposure campaigns.
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Manual,'4 Operation Rescue's "No Place To Hide How-To" Packet,"5
and Firestorm.'6
A. Abortion Buster's Manual
The Abortion Buster's Manual offers a work-book style primer
targeting areas where pro-life activists can "find the greatest amount
of dirt in the shortest time" in order to effectively "kill [doctors']
businesses." 7 In eleven chapters, the author uncovers the mysteries
of public records in order to aid pro-life advocates in discovering
doctors' identities," malpractice records," criminal records,"
information on clinics and health standards violations, 21 owners of
clinics,22 names of women who have died while undergoing abortions
under the care of specific doctors,23 and other information about
14. Kevin E. Sherlock, Abortion Buster's Manual (1985) (published under the auspices of
Operation Rescue of California, on file with the author).
15. Operation Rescue of California, Operation No Place To Hide How-To Packet (June 1,
1992) [hereinafter "OR's No Place to Hide"] (informally published by Operation Rescue of
California, on file with the author). See also Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1 (describing the formation
of the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA) after Operation Rescue was fatally divided
between supporters of violence against abortion providers asjustifiable homicide and those who
condemned the violence). The founding members of ACLA are former Operation Rescue
leaders who "refuse to condemn violence" and whose stated goal is "to find those abortionists
who are hiding out from public scrutiny and expose them." Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1. ACLA,
however, has been careful to avoid advertising its tactics and goals except in various pro-life
magazines including LTFE ADVOCATE which is published by Andrew Burnett, an ACLA leader.
Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1. However, the actions of ACLA mirror those encouraged in the
Operation Rescue Packet. Thus, the description of ACLA's tactics and the Operation Rescue
packet will be combined.
16. Mark Crutcher, Firestorm (1990) (on file with the author).
17. Sherlock, supra note 14, at i (combining his own experiences with those of others in his
group in investigating public records to create a book that "any pro-lifer in any state can use").
18. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 3-1 (explaining that methods of discovering doctors'
identities range from a simple phone call to an "abortion mill" to more covert methods like
tracing a doctor's license plate through a state's motor vehicle department).
19. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 4-1 (summarizing the civil court filing system and how to
track down information about any and all malpractice suits against a doctor in order to use his
"past against him" and "scare some women away from his operating tables").
20. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 5-1 (discussing the intricacies of the criminal court system
and how to research a doctor's local criminal record because "[i]f your local abortionist has no
scruples about killing babies ... what makes you think he's an otherwise law-abiding citizen?").
21. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 6-1 (explaining that "dirt on your local abortionist" can be
found through clinic and doctor monitoring agencies if "the abortion mill you are interested
in calls itself a clinic" and through the county public health department if "the abortionist"
works at a hospital).
22. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 7-1 (discussing methods of discovering who owns or operates
the building, clinic, or hospital housing "the abortion mill" so that the pro-lifer can then look
into the owner's criminal and tax records and possibly use the information to convince the
landlord to evict the clinic).
23. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 8-1 (noting that information linking a doctor to the death
of a patient can be the most damaging, Sherlock explains the procedures for getting copies of
coroner's reports and how to decipher the medical jargon to determine if a death was due to
a mistake made by the doctor performing the abortion).
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doctors (including home addresses and telephone numbers, insurance
carriers' names, etc.).24 The last section of the book instructs pro-
life activists on how to fully exploit the information they have found
by circulating it to patients, insurance companies, health agencies, the
media, and the general public.25
One method of distribution involves writing an "expos6 flyer"
describing lawsuits against the targeted doctor26 and deaths or
injuries which may have occurred at the clinic where the doctor
works." The author encourages his readers to post the flyers
around clinics, to give them to patients as they enter the clinics, and
to distribute them to local newspapers, officials, and the doctor's
insurance carrier. 8
B. Operation No Place to Hide
Operation Rescue of California introduced the idea of a "no place
to hide" campaign in early 1992.29 Since then, however, Operation
Rescue's leadership has split over the 1993 murder of Dr. David Gunn
in Pensacola, Florida and the 1994 murder of Dr. John B. Britton and
his escort, Lieutenant Colonel James H. Barrett.3" To those who
viewed the killings of abortion doctors as a logical extension of
24. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 9-1 (discussing the additional sources of information that can
help in the search for "dirt" such as voter registration, clinic literature, and newspaper files).
25. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-1 (noting that spreading the "dirt" found on an "abortion-
ist" is the "most important job of a muckraker" to "permanently damage [the doctor's]
reputation." Sherlock explains how to write reports to various government agencies, other
doctors, and insurance companies. He describes how to attract the news media, and he suggests
that letters to elected officials and hospitals are also helpful tools in distributing information
about the doctor.).
26. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-2 to 10-3 (explaining that the lawsuit need not be success-
ful, the fact that the doctor was sued is enough and for it to be noted on the flyer); see also
Sherlock, supra note 9, at A-1 to A-5 (analyzing a sample flier and its assembly).
27. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-3 (explaining the potential for lawsuits based on libel,
slander, or defamation, Sherlock instructs his readers to have proof for every sentence on the
flyer because the "truth is always your best defense." He also suggests that the flyer use words
like "allegedly," "apparently" and "claimed" to qualify statements that might be difficult to prove,
but still "let the reader draw the proper conclusion"); see also Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-3 to
A-4 (analyzing each individual passage in the model flyer, Sherlock supports his assertions with
case names, but does not say who prevailed on the merits. Interestingly, many of the suits
against the doctors are brought by the same people who distribute the flyers.); see generally,
Barbara Rochelle, Praying for Plaintiffs, FRONT LINES RESEARCH, 10 (1995) (exploring anti-
abortion groups' use of abortion malpractice claims as "propaganda to intimidate abortion
providers and insurers").
28. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-6 to 10-11 (emphasizing that getting the "dirt" to the
"right people" can convince even those not opposed to abortion "to shun, boycott or attack your
local abortionist" and "put him out of business").
29. OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15.
30. See Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1 (discussing how the transfer of killing abortion providers
from an abstract notion to a concrete practice drove a wedge between the anti-abortion militants
and the pro-life activists. Operation Rescue was also weakened by legislation and court rulings
making it a crime to block access to clinics).
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Operation Rescue's rhetoric, the statements by nationally recognized
Operation Rescue leaders like Flip Benham condemning the violence
seemed hypocritical, and thus, in the summer of 1994, the two sides
split into smaller groups."1 One of the groups supporting justifiable
homicide was the American Coalition of Life Activists (ACLA).
In the summer of 1994, ACLA began its campaign entitled "No
Place to Hide." 2 The spokesperson of ACLA explained that the
goal of the organization is "to find those abortionists who are hiding
out.., and expose them... bringing every facet of [a doctor's life]
to public scrutiny-his family, his suppliers, his office workers, his
bank, vacation plans, you name it.... ."'I This exposure campaign
seeks to inform the community of the targeted doctors' identities,
their home addresses and phone numbers, their license numbers,
places the doctors frequent, and any criminal or civil suits that have
been brought against the doctors.' 4
Picketing is a crucial element in the campaign, both outside of the
clinics and in front of the doctors' homes.3 5 Marchers circulate pro-
life literature and distribute copies of wanted signs, another important
feature of the exposure campaign." ACLA also encourages its mem-
bers to picket businesses such as restaurants, banks, and anywhere the
31. See Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1 (explaining that the circulation of Paul Hill's Justifiable
Homicide petition seems to have been the final straw in splitting Operation Rescue).
32. SeeAmerican Political Network, Inc., Abortion Report, Kansas LI ACLA to Hold Regional
Convention in Wchita, Mar. 28, 1995 (noting that many ACLA members signed Paul Hill'sjustifiable homicide petition); Egan, supra note 3, at 1:1 (explaining the membership of ACLA
as former Operation Rescue leaders who refuse to condemn the use of violence in their
campaign).
33. American Coalition of Life Activists paid advertisement in LIFE ADVOCATE, July 1994
[hereinafter ACLA advertisement]. See generally Telephone Interview with Christy Henderson,
Executive Director of Pro-Choice Mississippi (Oct. 8, 1994) (asserting that ACIA has no ties to
Operation Rescue and has been vague about its precise methodology, but the "No Place to
Hide" campaign is not new).
34. ORs No Place to Hide, supra note 15, at 8-9.
35. OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15, at 1 (emphasizing that use of the media is also
crucial; the "How to List" of running a "No Place to Hide" campaign suggests calling local radio,
television, and newspaper reporters to let them know about the campaign and advocates
picketing between 11:30 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. so that people can join in during their lunch
hours). While marching in a circle, demonstrators hold signs of aborted fetuses, pictures of the
doctors with words like "abortionist" or "murderer" below them, and phrases like "Dr. X kills
babies every day." OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15, at 6.
36. OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15, at 2-4 (explaining how to run a "Nowhere to
Hide" campaign, the OR packet includes several examples of preferred posters and flyers. The
posters are designed to mimic "Wanted" posters like those found in post offices. Both the flyers
and the posters include estimates of the number of abortions the doctor has performed and one
even intimates that women have died following an abortion by the doctor targeted in the flyer.).
See infra Appendix B (describing a typical wanted poster).
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doctor frequently may go.37 If the establishments are not picketed,
then they are given copies of wanted signs.-s
C. Firestorm
Life Dynamics, a pro-life organization based in Texas, published
Firestorm in order to detail its new strategy for the pro-life movement
making abortion unavailable, not illegal.3" The book discloses various
"guerrilla attacks,"4 two of which are aimed specifically at doctors
who perform abortions.4'
"Guerrilla One" employs a direct mail post-card strategy in which
the targeted doctor's neighbors and colleagues are mailed post-cards
similar in nature to the wanted signs used in the No Place to Hide
campaign discussed above. 2  The basic idea of this tactic is to
decrease the number of doctors willing to perform abortions by
stigmatizing and harassing them. 3 In addition to targeting doctors
on a personal level, Crutcher suggests alternative means of driving
abortion providers out of business, including driving doctors'
insurance rates up with malpractice claims,' lobbying for stricter
37. See Morning Edition (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 11, 1994) (1994 WL 8690168)
(discussing the ACLA's practice of picketing doctors not only at clinics but also anywhere else
the doctors go). The broadcast quoted Roy McMillan, an ACLA member, as saying "We want
everyone in the state [of Mississippi] to know the face and the name of the abortionist." Id.
38. Interview with Christy Henderson, supra note 33. See also Morning Edition (Aug. 11,
1994), supra note 4 (asserting that the goal of the ACLA's exposure campaigns is to "make life
so uncomfortable for doctors that they'll quit performing abortions voluntarily.").
39. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 34-36 (surmising that one of the main reasons abortion is
legal is due to "political inertia" and because "it happens 1.6 million times a year").
40. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 36 (citing WEBSTEt's NEw COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 310 (9th
ed. 1990)). Crutcher, president of Life Dynamics, calls his approach a "guerrilla strategy" and
exhorts his followers to engage in "irregular warfare" as members of an "independent unit
carrying out harassment and sabotage." Crutcher, supra note 16, at 36.
41. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 37 (claiming that the "biggest fear" of the abortion industry
is "running out of people who are willing to do abortions").
42. See Crutcher, supra note 16, at 41-42 (indicating that the post-cards should contain a
picture of the doctor, his or her name, home address, and any information regarding
malpractice suits that have been brought against him or her. Crutcher adds that these post
cards could also be distributed during "home pickets" in doctors' neighborhoods.). See also
Carol Gentry, Anti-Abortion Cards Target Doctors Sr. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 24, 1994, at B1
(citing Ann Baker of the National Center for the Pro-Choice Majority whose research indicates
that 100,000 pieces of mail are sent out by Life Dynamics every month. The mail campaign is
apparently not limited to abortion providers as doctors whose practices have no connection to
gynecology or abortion have received postcards discouraging the support of abortions.).
43. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 43 (contending that since the "vast majority" of doctors view
"abortionists as society's bottom feeders," the stigma need only be reinforced to convince
doctors to give up their abortion practices). See also Gentry, supra note 42, at B1 (according to
the American Medical Association, in 1993 Life Dynamics obtained the AMA's medical student
mailing list and sent a copy of their abortion joke book "Bottom Feeder" to over 30,000 medical
students. Medical authorities found the book "revolting.").
44. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 45 (focusing on doctors' profit motive, and their need for
malpractice insurance, Crutcher advocates pressuring insurance companies to raise their
premiums through legislation, but also by filing more malpractice suits against doctors).
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zoning regulations for clinics,' and removing abortion practices
from hospitals. 6
"Guerrilla Four" involves a secret manual containing training for
"operatives" living near a targeted doctor and plans to infiltrate and
dismantle the National Organization for Women (NOW) and Planned
Parenthood."7 The handbook incorporates harassment and publicity
techniques already developed by other pro-life organizations. 8 Also
contained in the manual is a plan to create negative publicity about
the pro-choice community, particularly doctors, through an increase
in malpractice claims and skeptical advertising.
49
D. The Result of these New Strategies
Having failed to make abortion illegal, anti-abortionists' current
strategy is to make abortion unavailable." Exposure campaigns, in
general, and wanted posters, in particular, are two key methods
currently employed by pro-life activists attempting to achieve this
goal.5 ' As an ACLA spokesperson explained in a statement to pro-
life activists, "I think we can expect [the] net result [of ACLA's No
Place to Hide campaign] over the next ten years to be the creation of
45. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 48-61 (suggesting that abortion clinics should suffer just as
large companies do from burdensome regulatory legislation. Thus, pro-lifers should support
and demand increased governmental regulation in areas such as fetal disposal, medical standards
and patient residency requirements.).
46. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 77-78 (maintaining that as long as abortions are only per-
formed in stand alone clinics, they will be easier to target than abortions performed in hospitals.
Thus, pro-lifers must endeavor to make the option of taking in abortion practices as unappealing
as possible to hospitals by attacking the hospital's public image.).
47. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 63-64 (asserting that if the pro-life movement can become
a "constant thorn in the abortion industry's side" by creating dissension within the pro-choice
community, Crutcher believes that the pro-life movement can put the pro-choice community on
the defensive and possibly create a situation where they would destroy themselves).
48. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 39-40, 64. See supra notes 17-35 and accompanying text
(discussing some of these techniques).
49. Crutcher, supra note 16, at 64-65. Accord Rochelle supra note 27, at 11, (describing Life
Dynamics' "abortion malpractice kit" which contains suggested legal tactics for targeting
doctors).
50. See Sandra G. Boodman, TheDearth ofAbortion Doctors, WASH. POST, Apr. 20,1993, at Z27
(quoting a field director of Operation Rescue saying that "We may not get laws changed or be
able to change people's minds.... [blut if there is no one willing to conduct abortions, there
are no abortions."); see also infra Section II (describing why this new strategy has developed. For
the remaining analysis in this article, a wanted poster will include exposd flyers and post-cards
as described above); see also supra notes 26-28 and 42 and accompanying text (discussing expos6
flyers and post-cards).
51. See Booth, supra note 2, at A3 (describing the fear generated by the wanted posters and
quoting Dr. David Gunn's replacement as saying "It might make a good story.., if I told you
everything about me. But they'd put me on a wanted poster, and then they'd put a bullet in
my head.").
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defacto abortion free zones."52 This prophesy is not so farfetched as
evidenced by the outcry of doctors against the violence and
harassment targeted at them. "The results of this intimidation
campaign are plain to see. Abortion may remain a legal option...
but there will be so few providers that access will become limited and
in some cases unavailable."" Wanted posters and the violence that
sometimes accompany them simply turn doctors away from perfor-
ming abortions. 4
Such posters have been linked to at least two cases of anti-abortion
violence against doctors.55 On different occasions, two Florida
doctors were shot in front of the clinics where they performed
abortions5 6 Both doctors were the subjects of wanted posters that
included their pictures, home addresses and telephone numbers, and
52. ACIA advertisement, supra note 33. See also Weekend Edition-Saturday (Jan. 21, 1995),
supra note 2 (summarizing statements made by the ACLA that their goals include pressuring
doctors to stop performing abortions and to create "abortion-free zones."). See, e.g., Morning
Edition (Aug. 11, 1994), supra note 4 (relaying pastor's declaration that the church "will not
picket with [ACLA] because we do not take the same position as they [do]"). This article does
not assert that all pro-life groups are involved in the violence; many (if not most) fervently
criticize violent behavior. Unfortunately, however, militant groups gain more exposure than
peaceful protesters, and this often incites even more violence. SeeAnthony Flint, Some Say Law
too Harsh on Abortion Foes, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1995, at 8 (responding to the abortion clinic
killings by John Salvi in Brookline, Massachusetts on December 30, 1994, non-violent pro-life
advocates argue that "When adherents see that their movement is being strangled by powerful
government forces, however, the practical effect may provoke and anger the most radial
extremists.").
53. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 636 Before the Subcomm.
on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Human Resources, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1993) (testimony of
Dr. Pablo Rodriguez, Medical Director of Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island) (explaining his
own experiences as a doctor targeted by an anti-abortion campaign and relaying the general
feeling among abortion providers).
54. SeeAmerican Political Network, Inc., Healthline, Abortion: Number of Ob/Gyns Performing
Procedure Drops, Sept. 22, 1995 (citing a survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation which found that
21% of the Ob/Gyns surveyed who did not perform abortions cited community pressure as the
reason); see also Implementation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime and CriminalJustice House Comm. on theJudiciary, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 58 (1994)
(testimony of Dr. George Klopfer, Fort Wayne Women's Health Organization) (relating the
effects of the anti-abortion exposure campaign and the increasing violence on doctors. "The
death threats come when you are surrounded by individuals who will openly tell you they are
going to break your neck like a twig ... it is this constant harassment ... that takes its toll not
only on the physicians, but the family, the clinic staffand... individuals that are affiliated with
the clinics.").
55. See Mike Williams, Doctor Slain at Abortion Clinic in Florida, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., March
11, 1993, at Al (noting that Dr. David Gunn, killed in March of 1993 by abortion protestor
Michael Griffin, was the subject of a wanted poster in the summer of 1992).
56. See Kathy Sawyer, Turning from "Weapon of the Spirit" to Shotgun, WASH. POST, Aug. 7,
1994, atAl (discussing the shooting deaths of Dr.John Britton and his bodyguard, Lieutenant
Colonel James H. Barrett, outside of the Ladies Center of Pensacola. Both men were shot in
the head by shotgun blasts fired by abortion opponent Paul Hill. The two men died instantly.);
id. (discussing the shooting death of Dr. David Gunn behind Pensacola Women's Medical
Services Clinic).
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other personal information. 7 This type of vehemence indicates that
doctors who perform abortions need protection; they should be
afforded the benefits of the privacy torts to stop the exposure
campaigns, curb the violence, and, in turn, protect reproductive
freedom.
II: WHY HAS THIS NEW TREND DEVELOPED?
With the Clinton administration's pro-choice policies and the
Supreme Court's refusal to overturn Roe v. Wade,5" many pro-life
activists "concede that their momentum has ground to a crawl," and
the "political [and] judicial sector[s of the pro-life movement] have
been very badly hurt." 9
Aside from the political difficulties arising from the election of a
pro-choice president, the pro-life movement has also suffered several
legal defeats in the past few years. First, in Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Pa. v. Casey,60 the Supreme Court made clear that it would continue
to recognize the basic constitutional right to an abortion.61 More
recently, the Court decided that pro-life groups could be sued under
the Federal Racketeering Act (RICO).62 Finally, in Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., the Court held that an injunction creating
a buffer zone around an abortion clinic entrance and driveway was
content neutral and did not violate the First Amendment.6
57. See Williams, supra note 55, at Al (noting that at an Operation Rescue Rally in the
summer of 1992, wanted posters of Dr. Gunn were distributed listing his address and telephone
number and encouraging protestors to harass his co-workers); CBS This Morning (CBS television
broadcast, Nov. 1, 1994) (1994 WL 3530844) (interviewing Patricia Ireland of NOW about the
shooting of Dr. Britton, "they [anti-abortion protestors] took his photograph, they traced his
license plate, they put out wanted posters with his name, address and schedule. They... all but
put a target on his back."). Dr. Britton was in fact Dr. Gunn's replacement and after protestors
discovered his name through his license plate number, IHE ADVoCATE printed his name and
address and stated that he was "responsible 'for the deaths of thousands of babies.'" N.Y. Times
News Service, supra note 12, at A9.
58. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809
(1992) (holding that on the basis of stare decisis, the central rule of Roe v. Wade has not proven
"unworkable" and thus there is no reason to overrule the decision).
59. Lynn Smith, Bowed, but Unbroken?, LA. TIMES, Mar. 2,1993, at El (discussing the effects
of President Clinton's pro-choice policies, which reversed the gag rule preventing discussion of
abortion at federally funded clinics and the ban on fetal tissue research on the pro-life
movement. Although "frustrated," many groups also feel "reinvigorated by adversity 4nd are
regrouping.").
60. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
61. See generally THE SUPREME COURT CoNFrsoNr ABORTION (Leon Friedman, ed. 1993)
(analyzing the Casey decision and its aftermath).
62. National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798, 804 (1994) (holding that
18 U.S.CA §§ 1961-68 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (RICO) does not require proof of"economic
purpose" for an association to be deemed an enterprise engaged "in a pattern of racketeering
activity.").
63. 114 S. Ct 2516, 2527 (1994) (finding that the 36 foot buffer zone prohibited "no more
speech than necessary" to accomplish the state's interest in protecting access to the clinic).
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These cases reveal the Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn the
fundamental holding of Roe v. Wade that a woman has a constitutional
right to an abortion.' Recognizing this, the pro-life movement has
shifted its focus away from making abortion illegal and toward making
abortion unavailable.65 Activists have concluded that the best way to
accomplish this task is to target doctors. 66 Unfortunately, some
militant pro-life activists feel that violence is the only means left to
accomplish this goal.67
In response to the violence campaign, Congress passed the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)' in early 1994,
and in May of 1994, President Clinton signed the bill into law.69
FACE essentially makes the blocking of clinic entrances a federal
crime with a maximum sentence of one year for a first violation and
three years for subsequent violations.7" Through the establishment
64. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy
is included in the Constitutional right of privacy).
65. See Boodman, supra note 50, at Z27 (attributing the shortage of Ob/Gyns who perform
abortions to pro-life campaigns against individual doctors).
66. See Weekend Edition-Saturday (Jan. 21, 1995), supra note 2 (discussing the activities of
various pro-life organizations on the 22nd anniversary of Roe v. Wade which included ACLA's
announcement of 12 doctors that they plan to target in the upcoming year. David Crane, ACLA
Virginia Director explained that the 12 persons named would be fully exposed to encourage
them to see what they do as the killing of little children); see alsoJohn Bazar, Abortion Foes Test
the Limits; Is the Use of Even Deadly ForceJustifed?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at Al (quoting a pro-
life activist as saying, "The transcendent question being forced on the pro-life movement is...
it would be right if your family was defended from murderers by someone using lethal force.
Why not a fetus?"); see also supra Section I (discussing specific techniques aimed at getting
doctors to stop performing abortions).
67. See Bazar, supra note 66, at Al (discussing the increase in physical violence against
abortion clinics and doctors in the 1980s and referring to a 1988 Alan Guttmacher Institute
Study which documented an 11% decline in abortion providers over six years); Tamar Lewin,
Death of a Doctor: The MoralDebate, N.Y. TIMES,July 30, 1994, at 1:1 (reviewing the debate within
the pro-life movement over the morality of killing abortion doctors and quoting Don Treshman,
Director of Rescue America, as saying "[a] s a result of the Clinton Administration's oppressive
efforts to stop even peaceful pro-life activities, I fear there will be more bombings and shootings.
Up to now, the killings have been on one side, with thirty million dead babies .... On the
other side, there are two dead doctors. Maybe the balance is going to shift.").
68. 18 U.S.CA. § 248(a) (West Supp. 1995). ("Whoever-by force or threat of force or
by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to intimi-
date such person or any other person or any class of persons from, obtaining or providing
reproductive health services... shall be subject to the penalties provided in subsection (b) and
the civil remedies provided in subsection (c) . . ").
69. SeeLaurence McQuillan, Clinton SignsAbortion ClinicBil4 LawsuitFiled, REuTERs, May26,
1994 (quoting President Clinton as saying "We simply cannot, we must not, continue to allow
the.. . campaigns of intimidation of law-abiding citizens that has given rise to this law.").
70. 18 U.S.C.A. § 248(b) (West Supp. 1995).
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of fines and civil remedies, 7' FACE is designed to protect both
patients and providers.72
Although FACE appeared to be a substantial win for pro-choice
activists,73 the statute, thus far, has proven inadequate at deterring the
violence and threats.7 4 Only nine days after the bill's signing,
protesters in Milwaukee barricaded themselves with chains, concrete,
and iron inside and around two cars located outside of a local
abortion clinic.75  Furthermore, hours before President Clinton
signed the bill, the American Life League filed a complaint in
response to FACE calling for declaratory judgment, preliminary and
permanent injunctions, and class action certification in the U.S.
District Court in Alexandria, Virginia.76 In addition, immediately
after the signing of the bill, the American Center for Law and Justice
and Operation Rescue filed an emergency stay in the U.S. District
Court in the District of Columbia." Within a week of the bill's
signing, at least six similar suits were also filed around the nation.78
71. Id. (including for the first offense, a maximum fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for up
to one year and for the second or subsequent offense, a maximum fine of $25,000 or
imprisonment for up to three years. Exclusively non-violent violations have lesser fines and
sentences. A bodily injury exception applies to both first and subsequent offenses in that the
length of imprisonment is increased to a maximum often years. If death results, imprisonment
can be for any term of years or for life. The civilremedies include temporary, preliminary, or
permanent injunctions; compensatory and punitive damages; and reasonable legal costs,
including attorneys' and expert witnesses' fees. Aplaintiffhas the option of recovering statutory
damages in the amount of $5,000 per violation in lieu of actual damages. Furthermore, the U.S.
Attorney General or state attorney general may also bring an action for injunctive relief and
compensatory damages (to be awarded to the injured person). For first-time, non-violent
physical obstructions, violators may also be fined up to $10,000 in civil penalties and $15,000 for
subsequent non-violent obstructions.).
72. S. 636, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CAN. 108 Stat. 694 ("[I]t
is the purpose of this Act to protect and promote the public safety ... by establishing ...
penalties and civil remedies for.., conduct that is intended to injure, intimidate or interfere
with persons seeking to obtain or provide reproductive health services.").
73. See Ruth Marcus, President Signs Clinic Access Law, WASH. POST, May 27, 1994, at A10
(citing statements by the American Civil Liberties Union that FACE was "a milestone in
congressional protection for reproductive freedom" and that it protects "peaceful protest and
free speech").
74. SeeSpecial Hearing on Violence at Women's Health Clinics, supra note 6, (asserting that
in the first seven months of 1994,67% of abortion clinics surveyed reported at least one incident
of violence ranging from death threats to vandalism); see also Eisler, supra note 11 (recounting
findings of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and CriminalJustice that the level of
violence against clinic doctors did not decrease since the passage of FACE).
75. SeeLyle Denniston, Six in Wisconsin Charged UnderNew Law on Abortion Clinics, BALT. SUN,
June 7, 1994, at A9 (noting that this was the first criminal case pursued under FACE and that
its constitutionality was already being challenged in five federal courts nationwide).
76. SeeAmerican Life League Press Release, May 26, 1994 (asserting that FACE was a denial
of free speech for pro-life believers and thus, unconstitutional).
77. SeeJoshua Project Press Release, May 26, 1994 (proclaiming FACE as violative of pro-life
supporters' First Amendment rights).
78. See, e.g., American Political Network, Inc., Abortion Report, Spotlight Story Face 11:
Louisiana, Arizona Suits Challenge Constitutionality, (asserting violations of pro-life supporters civil
rights and asking for an injunction blocking enforcement of FACE until the constitutionality is
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While some courts have upheld the statute,79 at least one court has
determined that FACE is unconstitutional."0
As the cases demonstrate, there has been much debate surrounding
the constitutionality of FACE. Professors Michael Stokes Paulsen and
Michael W. McConnell1 argue that the statute
[G]riminalizes speech that is intended to 'discourage abortion.'82
It applies to no other speech. Other protestors who commit acts of
trespass or violence-animal rights activists, antinuclear protestors,
opponents of racism or sexism-are not covered by the [act], even
if their protests are equally violent.83 Congress has selected a
single point of view-opposition to abortion-and subjected it to
penalties applied to no other point of view. 4
settled).
79. SeeCheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517,1521-22 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that FACE is within
Congress' Commerce Clause powers, is content neutral and narrowly tailored and therefore does
not violate the Tenth Amendment nor the First Amendment's freedom of expression or exercise
clauses. The court also found that FACE did not substantially burden abortion protestors'
religious beliefs); American Life League v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 652-53 (4th Cir.) (upholding
FACE as a content neutral, narrowly tailored restriction on protected speech), cert. denied 116
S. Ct. 55 (1995).
Multiple District Courts have also upheld FACE as constitutional. See Riely v. Reno, 860 F.
Supp. 1286, 1289 (D. Mo. 1995) (holding that FACE is constitutional in response to a facial
challenge); U.S. v. White, 893 F. Supp. 1423, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the commercial
ramifications of abortion clinic violence is a national issue beyond the scope of local authorities
and upholding FACE's constitutionality); Council for Life Coalition v. Reno, 856 F. Supp. 1422,
1431 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that FACE is a legitimate extension of Congress' Commerce
Clause power that does not violate protestors' First or Fifth Amendment rights); U.S.v. Hill, 893
F. Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (holding that FACE falls within Congress' Commerce
Clause power); U.S. v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1421, 1424 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that FACE is
constitutional despite challenges to Congress' Commerce Clause power and claims of First
Amendment violations); Cook v. Reno, 859 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (W.D. La. 1994) (concluding
that FACE is a valid extension of legislative power that does not violate protestors' right to
freedom of speech).
80. See U.S. v. Wilson, 880 F. Supp. 621,630 (E.D. Wisc. 1995) (holding that Congress over-
stepped its Commerce Clause powerbecause the regulation of clinic protestors outlined in FACE
are not aimed at (1) an activity that undermines a national regulatory scheme; (2) a commercial
activity affecting "the right to travel interstate" nor (3) an activity that "employs violent means
to achieve an economic purpose.").
81. Professor McConnell is a William B. Graham Professor of Law at the University of
Chicago Law School.
82. Michael Stokes Paulsen and Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful Constitutionality of the
Clinic Access Bil, 1 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 261 (1994) (arguing that FACE is unconstitutionally
selective in its regulation of the anti-abortion movement and if allowed to stand will constitute
a marked departure from the country's past tolerance of political activity in the name of civil
rights).
83. 1d. at 281-82 (alleging that the drafters of FACE were not "legislating neutrally" and that
if the drafters were thinking generally about the effects of illegal protesting "they would broaden
the statute to encompass all such instances of unlawful protest that interferes with the rights of
others, irrespective of the object of the protest.").
84. Id. at 283 (noting that FACE does not provide for penalties in the case of violence by
pro-choice activists against pro-life supporters).
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Specifically, they note several problems with FACE: the penalties are
excessive;8 5 ordinary protestors will be jailed unjustly;s" and the
definitions are so indistinct that free speech rights of the entire pro-
life movement will certainly be chilled. 7
Moreover, Paulsen and McConnell assert that FACE suffers from
two main constitutional problems. First, the statute is un-
constitutionally vague and overbroad.'u Second, the restrictions
represent content-based punishment of civil disobedience and
therefore violate the First Amendment. 9
Laurence Tribe, however, disagrees with Paulsen and McConnell
and argues that FACE does not in fact single out speech or even
expressive conduct driven by a specific ideology Comparing FACE
to Title VII, Tribe states that FACE does nothing more than "punish
those engaged in violence and intimidation with the intent to prevent
others from exercising their constitutional right to obtain or provide
abortion services."9
Whatever the constitutionality of FACE, one thing is clear; the
statute has proven to be little more than a band-aid solution for anti-
abortion violence and harassment of doctors.92 FACE will have little,
if any, effect on the exposure techniques of pro-life groups, simply
85. 1& at 263 (noting that "peaceful sit-in" participants could end up injail for one to three
years).
86. Id. at 263 (noting that enforcement of FACE is not confined to violent or unlawful
acts).
87. Paulsen and McConnell, supra note 82, at 263 (asserting that even "peaceful protestors
will face the real prospect of legal harassment by their ideological opponents").
88. Paulsen and McConnell, supra note 82, at 265-66 (contending that the overbreadth is
substantial enough to render FACE "unconstitutional on its face").
89. Paulsen and McConnell, supra note 82, at 265 (referring to RA.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) in which the Supreme Court held that a Minnesota ordinance was
impermissibly content-based and thus facially invalid).
90. Laurence Tribe, The Constitutionality of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 1 VA.
J. Soc. POL'Y AND L 291, 299-300 (1994) (arguing that FACE avoids any violation of the First
Amendment and is a valid extension of Congressional power to ensure that women have access
to their constitutional right to abortion).
91. I. at 302 (noting that the holding in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992)
does not require Congress to be neutral in distinguishing between actions directed at preventing
the exercise of the right to terminate a pregnancy and the exercise of other rights).
92. See Implementation of the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, supra note 54, at 71(testimony of Linda Taggert, Administrator of the Ladies Center in Pensacola, Florida)
(explaining her futile attempts to get local or federal authorities to prosecute Paul Hill under
FACE for his harassment of Dr. Britton only two months before Hill murdered the doctor and
his escortJames Barrett. Hill was arrested and released on a noise violation just over a month
before he killed Dr. Britton). See also Stephanie Simon, Abortion Foes Assail Violence, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1995 at BI (noting that even professed non-violent pro-life groups blamed FACE for the
escalation in violence by anti-abortion radicals. Joseph Forman, of the California Missionaries
to the Preborn, says "Any time the government seeks to oppress public protest.., you have a
situation where there's no reasonable way a reasonable person can express himself.").
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because the statute's main focus is the clinic and patients.93 Conse-
quently, doctors who perform abortions cannot rely on FACE to
provide adequate protection against pro-life harassment and in-
timidation.
III: WHAT CAN DOCTORS Do ABOUT THE EXPOSURE TECHNIQUES?
A. Introduction to the Privacy Torts
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis wrote a Harvard
Law Review article calling for an explicit new tort that would
recognize protection for citizens from harm caused by the press when
it exposed private concerns to the public; essentially they argued for
the right to be let alone.94 In 1960, Dean Prosser synthesized the
opinions and articles written in response to Warren and Brandeis and
identified four distinct torts that evolved from them: appropriation
of the plaintiffs likeness or name for defendant's financial gain;95
intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude;96 publicity which
93. See 18 U.S.CA § 248(a) (West. Supp. 1995) (focussing primarily on clinic access and
not protection of doctors away from work, FACE requires specific intent to injure or intimidate
a provider due to his or her involvement with abortion services).
94. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to PAivaty, 4 HARV. L REV. 193,195
(1890) (arguing that "the sacred precincts of private and domestic life" were being invaded by
the expanding capabilities of the press, Warren and Brandeis asserted that
[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of
decency. Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has
become a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery.... The intensity
and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary
some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has
become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more
essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and invention have, through
invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater than
could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
IL at 196. After the article was published, courts and scholars began to use the concept of
privacy protection in a myriad of ways, many of which were completely different from the
original use contemplated by Warren and Brandeis. See William L. Prosser, Pfivacy, 48 CAUF.
L. REV. 383, 390 (1960) (noting that the principle of physical intrusion of privacy established
by Warren and Brandeis was soon extended to wire tapping and spying in windows).
95. Prosser, supra note 94, at 401 (explaining that the main question for courts is whether
there has been an appropriation of not only the plaintiff's name but also her identity for the
defendant's advantage, and then whether the plaintiff herself has appropriated her identity for
her own advantage).
Prosser's second tort of likeness for financial reasons will not be discussed here because, at
least so far, it is irrelevant to the situation between pro-life activists and doctors. For a discussion
of the tort see Annotation, Invasion of Privacy by Use of Plaintiff's Name or Likeness in Advertis-
ing, 23 A.L.R13d 865, 901 (1969). See also RESTATENMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977)
(recognizing the common law tort of the invasion of privacy, and dividing it in the same manner
as Prosser).
96. Prosser, supra note 94, at 389 (noting that while the idea of intrusion has progressed
beyond basic physical intrusion, the intrusion must still by nature be something "offensive or
objectionable to a reasonable man" and involve an element of the plaintiff's life which she is
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places the plaintiff in a false light before the public;9 7 and public
disclosure of embarrassing private facts. 8 This section will review
the basic elements of the latter three torts and then explain how
doctors who perform abortions can use these torts to bring suit
against pro-life activists participating in exposure campaigns.
B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
This intrusion tort deals with offensive impingement upon the
plaintiff's person or private affairs.9 A doctor who performs
reasonably entitled to keep private).
97. Prosser, supra note 94, at 398 (observing that the false light tort protects the plaintiff's
reputation by providing a remedy when an utterance is falsely attributed to him or her or their
likeness is used in a publication to which the plaintiff has no reasonable connection).
98. See Prosser supra note 94 at 389 (remarking that "public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about the plaintiff" was the tort with which Warren and Brandeis were principally
concerned. The disclosure must be public and the fact must be private and deemed offensive
to a reasonable person).
99. Twenty-four states recognize the intrusion tort. See K-Mart Corp. v. Weston, 530 So.2d
736, 739 (Ala. 1988) (concluding that whether the defendant's employee's announcement of
plaintiff's bad credit in front of other customers qualified as wrongful intrusion was a question
of fact properly left to the jury); Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123,1138
(Alaska 1989) (asserting that employer drug testing of employees is not an unwarranted
intrusion); People v. Brown, 151 Cal. Rptr. 749, 754 & n.4 (Cal. App. 1979) (noting that a visit
by the police to the defendant's hospital room was not an intrusion because a nurse permitted
entry, and the police intended to question the defendant, not search the room); Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe v. State Dep't of Revenue Servs., Div. of Special Revenue, No. 101113, 1994 WL
463625 at *2 (Conn. Super. Aug. 18,1994) (concluding that whether the defendant's contacting
the plaintiff without her permission was an "intentional physical intrusion" that was "highly
offensive to a reasonable person" was a question of fact for thejury); Beckett v. Trice, No. 92C-
08-029, 1994 WL 710874 at *6 (Del. Super. Nov. 4, 1994), af/'d 660 A.2d 395 (Del. 1994)
(asserting that a sexual relationship premised on false pretenses does not qualify as an intrusion
because the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the defendant into her life); Williams v. City of
Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 689 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (noting that unreasonable intrusion
upon seclusion is one of four categories of the tort of invasion of privacy);Jarrett v. Butts, 379
S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ga. Ct. App 1989) (finding that photographs taken by a teacher of a student
during regular school hours, in the presence of other students, were not an intrusion); Miller
v. Motorola, Inc., 560 N.E.2d 900, 904 (M. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that defendant's publication
of private information voluntarily provided by the plaintiff did not qualify as an unauthorized
intrusion); Stessman v. American Black Hawk Broadcasting Co., 416 N.W.2d 685, 687 (Iowa
1987) (finding that plaintiff was not precluded from claiming intrusion upon seclusion when
she was filmed in a restaurant without her permission); Finlay v. Finlay, 856 P.2d 183, 189-90
(Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that the smeli from defendant's farm operation was not an
unreasonable intrusion qualifying as an invasion of privacy because there was no intrusion using
physical or sensory means); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1117 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App.) (holding that a listening device attached to plaintiffs door by the defendant was
an intrusion) cert. dmei 508 A.2d 488 (Md.) and cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986); Knight v.
Penobscot Bay Medical Ctr., 420 A.2d 915, 918 (Me. 1980) (affirming that whether a third
party's presence in the delivery room constitutes an intrusion is a question of fact); Duran v.
Detroit News, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that obtaining
information from the newspaper and plaintiffs guards did not constitute an intrusion); People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1121, 1132-33 (Nev.
1994) (finding that plaintiffs claim must fail because he had no expectation of privacy or
seclusion); Rumbauskas v. Cantor, 649 A.2d 853, 857-58 (N.J. 1994) (holding that an action for
intrusion on seclusion under the auspices of the privacy tort qualifies as a claim for "injury to
the person" when conduct such as stalkings and violent threats are present); Gilmore v. Enogex,
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abortions could use this tort to assert a claim against pro-life advocates
who picket his or her home."°  To succeed, a doctor would first
have to prove that the protest was an intentional intrusion, physical
or otherwise, into his or her solitude or private affairs.01 Secondly,
the doctor would have to prove that the picket was highly offensive to
a reasonable person.
0 2
The intrusion upon seclusion tort was at issue in Valenzuela v.
Aquino.10 3 In that case, a doctor and his family sued for injunctive
relief and damages for invasion of privacy arising from the picketing
Inc., 878 P.2d 360, 366 (Okla. 1994) (holding that an employer's drug testing of an employee
does not constitute an intrusion); Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Or.
C. App. 1990) (holding that jury must find conduct, unlawful trespass, highly offensive to a
reasonable person to impose liability); Santillo v. Reedel, 634 A.2d 264, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (recognizing the intrusion upon seclusion tort); Baldwin v. First Nat'l Bank of Black Hills,
362 N.W.2d 85, 88 (S.D. 1985) (concluding that plaintiff had no claim for intrusion where he
authorized a credit institution to provide information); Farrington v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc., 865
S.W.2d 247, 253 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that drug and polygraph testing of employees
does not satisfy the nonconsenual element of the intrusion upon seclusion tort); Turner v.
General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62,67 (Utah Ct. App.) (concluding that information
gathered by worker's compensation claim investigators did not constitute an intrusion) cert.
denied; 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1129 (Vt.
1992) (holding that one letter threatening termination did not constitute an intrusion); City of
Tacoma v. Tacoma News, Inc., 827 P.2d 1094, 1097 n.7 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that
intrusion upon seclusion is one of four ways that the tort of invasion of privacy can be
committed); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 84-85 (W. Va. 1983)
(recognizing that the four categories of the right to privacy include an unreasonable intrusion
upon seclusion).
100. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 477 (1988) (upholding an ordinance that made
it "unlawful for any person to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling of
any individual."). Because the ordinance prohibited "speech directed primarily at those who are
presumptively unwilling to receive it, the state ha[d] a substantial and justifiable interest in
banning" such speech. Id. at 488. Furthermore, "the nature and scope of this interest ma[de]
the ban narrowly tailored. The ordinance also [left] open ample alternative channels of
communication and (wals content neutral. Thus, largely because of its narrow scope, the facial
challenge to the ordinance [had to] fail." Id
In Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr, 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994), the Court reviewed an injunction
against anti-abortion protestors. The injunction included a 36-foot buffer zone around abortion
clinic entrances and driveways and a 300-foot buffer zone around patients seeking abortions and
staff residences. The Court struck down the 300-foot buffer zone because it burdened more
speech than necessary to serve government interests. Id. at 2530. The Court, however, upheld
the 36-foot buffer zone. I&. at 2528. Cf. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457, 465 (1980) (striking
a residential picketing statute on equal protection grounds because the statute allowed an
exception for "peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute." This
comprised an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and other kinds of picketing.).
101. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (noting that this tort does not
depend upon publicity of the invaded party's affairs, but rather an intrusion into the invaded
party's solitude).
102. Id at cmt. d.
103. 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993) (claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress as
well). The majority found that no such action existed in Texas. Id. (citing Boyles v. Kerr, 855
S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. 1993) as overruling previous cases by holding that no general duty exists
in Texas to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress).
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of their home by abortion opponents.' °" The majority ack-
nowledged that the Texas Supreme Court had previously recognized
the intrusion tort,0 5 but remanded because the jury had not
resolved the factual disputes as to whether there was an intentional
intrusion and whether the picketing was highly offensive to a
reasonable person.'16  The dissenting opinions, however, argued
that these elements had been satisfied by the jury's findings, and
therefore the defendants had breached the Aquino's privacy.0 7 The
jury found that the picketing was focused or directed at the Aquino
residence, and the trial court granted a permanent injunction
prohibiting the defendants from engaging in any type of picketing
within 400 feet of the Aquino's property.1°' The state court of
appeals upheld the injunction,0 9 but the state supreme court
reversed and remanded the case. 110
Justice Gonzalez, dissenting, believed that as a matter of law, the
Aquinos proved an invasion of their privacy."' Because she
believed the appeals court was correct in upholding the injunction,
Justice Gonzalez's opinion concentrated on the First Amendment
aspects of limiting the defendants' speech." 2 Noting that peaceful
picketing is one type of expressive conduct that merits constitutional
protection,1'3 she pointed out that such behavior is not free from
104. Id at 520-21 (SpectorJ., dissenting). Dr. Aquino maintained an obstetrics and gyneco-
logical practice of which only a small part was devoted to providing abortions. Id. at 514. After
nearly six years of regular picketing of Dr. Aquino's place of business, anti-abortion protestors
began picketing his residence. I&
105. I& at 513 (citing Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 861 (1973) as holding that the
tort of invasion of privacy is a "willful tort" constituting a legal injury for which damages are
recoverable even without physical injury).
106. Id. at 512-13 (incorporating the RESTATEMENT'S definition of the tort of invasion of
privacy into Texas law).
107. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 514 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting); Id.
at 519 (Gammage,J., dissenting); Id. at 522 (SpectorJ., dissenting). Justice Dogget concurred
in the judgment only. Id. at 514.
108. Id. at 515. The trial court also awarded $810,000 in damages. Id.
109. 853 S.W.2d at 515. The court of appeals, however, reversed the damages award. Id.
110. Id. (upholding the appellate court's reversal of the damage award).
111. ML at 514-15 (Gonzalez,J., dissenting) (finding that the record revealed that the picket-
ing had a devastating effect on Dr. Aquinos' family members, causing some to become physically
ill).
112. Id. Justice Gonzalez would have held that the state had a "compelling interest in
protecting the common law right of privacy of an individual and (could] therefore place
reasonable restrictions on the picketers right of free expression." Id. at 514 (citing Billings v.
Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973) as holding that an invasion of privacy constitutes a
recoverable injury).
113. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tex. 1993) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S.
312, 318 (1988) which struck down a District of Columbia ordinance restricting embassy
picketing because the ordinance was content based); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)(striking legislation prohibiting picketing in residential areas in all but labor dispute cases). See
also Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 14 (Tex. 1992) (holding that Article I, Section 8 of the
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all restrictions." 4 Because the picketing at issue took place on a
public sidewalk, a traditional public forum, the state could implement
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions only if the state
demonstrated a compelling interest. 15 Relying on the Frisby v.
Schultz line of cases to support her conclusion,"' Justice Gonzalez
found the injunction at issue in Valenzuela to be sufficiently narrowly
tailored to protect the Aquino's privacy and therefore, the injunction
was proper, and the majority's analysis was incorrect.'
On the other hand, Justice Spector's dissent focused on the
intrusion upon seclusion tort."' He explained that the first element
of the tort, an intentional intrusion, was satisfied by the jury's finding
that the picketing was focused on the Aquino's residence." 9 He
also concluded that the second element was satisfied because, as the
U.S. Supreme Court explained, directed residential picketing is, by its
nature, highly offensive to a reasonable person:
The devastating effect of targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment
of the home is beyond doubt.... The resident is figuratively, and
Texas Constitution is an independently viable document that the state can interpret to give
more rights than those conferred by the Federal Constitution).
114. 853 S.W.2d at 516 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,488 (1988) which upheld a ban
on residential picketing that singled out individual residences. The Court found the ban served
the significant governmental interest of protecting residential privacy and was narrowly tailored
to achieve that goal.).
115. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (applying a
three-part test to government restraints on speech in a public forum. The restriction must be
content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and structured in
a manner that leaves open alterative channels of expression).
116. See, e.g., Klebanoffv. McMonagle, 552 A.2d 677, 682 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding
an injunction against picketing in front of a residence because states may place standard time,
place, and manner restrictions on speech); Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 939
F.2d 57, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (upholding an injunction's 2500-foot buffer zone for sound
equipment and bullhorns and modifying the injunction to place a 500-foot buffer zone on
picketing in front of an abortion clinic). Cf. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 114 S. Ct. 2516,
2526-27 (1994) (holding that an injunction creating a 36 foot buffer zone around an abortion
clinic did not violate the First Amendment because the content-neutral injunction burdened no
more speech than necessary and served a significant government interest). The Court also held
that the restriction was not content based merely because it restricted only anti-abortion
protestors' speech. Id. The injunction was imposed on this group because of its past violations
of a court order. Id. at 2523. The Court also held that the proper test for evaluating the
injunction's restriction on free speech should be more stringent than the usual time, place, and
manner review of ordinances. Id. An injunction must be "no broader than necessary to achieve
its goals." Id. at 2525.
117. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 519 (Tex. 1993) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
Justice Gammage agreed withJustice Gonzalez but wrote separately because he disagreed with
her opinion regarding damages. Id.
118. lM. at 522 (SpectorJ., dissenting) (assuming that the record's reference to an intrusion
upon seclusion referred to this tort as defined in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs§ 652B).
119. Id. at 523 (Spector, J., dissenting) (finding evidence in the record that the picketers
carried placards reading, "God Gives Life, Aquino Takes It Away," and "Nice House Dr.
Eduardo, How Many Babies Paid the Price?").
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perhaps literally, trapped within the home, and because of the
unique and subtle impact of such picketing[,] is left with no ready
means of avoiding the unwanted speech. Thus, the "evil" of
targeted residential picketing, "the very presence of an unwelcome
visitor at the home," is "created by the medium of expression
itself.''1 2
0
Spector concluded that because the Aquinos proved each element of
the tort, they were properly granted the injunction to protect them
from further invasions of privacy.
122
Justice Spector's dissent then focused on balancing the Aquino's
right to privacy against the defendants' right to free speech. 22 He
identified two types of privacy rights at issue in this case: first, there
was the Aquino's right to preserve the sanctity of their home,123 and
second, there was the broader issue of a woman's right to decide
whether to have an abortion. 24 Noting that the ability of women
to make this decision had been severely constricted, Spector described
how doctors who perform abortions were seen as a "weak link" in the
supplying of abortion services and were therefore viewed as favorable
targets for harassment."z  "[O]rganizations across the state and
nation have used a strategy of harassment and intimidation to
'dissuade skilled clinicians from entering this field or [to] convince
them to quit .... [C]ommunities must curb the harassment of
120. Id (citing Frisby, 487 U.S. at 486-87) (internal citations omitted).
121. Id. at 524 (Spector, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices were concerned with the
deleterious effects that the picketing caused, the long span of time over which the picketing had
been occurring, and the additional time needed for final resolution when the case was
remanded. Id. at 522-24. The record indicated that the picketing occurred when Dr. Aquino
was at work and his children were at home after school. Id at 519-20. During the picketing,
the children cried, locked themselves in their rooms, and the oldest child had to be temporarily
placed in a psychiatric institution before being sent to live with an aunt in Paraguay. Id. at 521.
122. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 524 (Tex. 1993).
123. Id. (SpectorJ., dissenting) (providing a brief history of Texas' treatment of this right
and the state's view of the household as a sanctuary and citing Porter v. Southwestern Public
Serv. Co., 489 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) as holding that the sanctity of one's private
land is powerful enough to prevent eminent domain powers from usurping the city's zoning
ordinances); Texas State Employees Union v. Tex. Dept. of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203,205 (Tex. 1987) (interpreting the Texas Constitution to "guarantee
the sanctity of the individual's home and person against unreasonable intrusion.")).
124. 853 S.W.2d at 524 (Spector, J., dissenting) (stating that the right of privacy "is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy" (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1972)). See also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2804 (1992) (reaffirming a woman's right to choose to have an abortion before fetal
viability but replacing the strict trimester framework of Roe with an "undue burden" analysis).
125. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 525 (Tex. 1993) (citing David A. Grimes,
Clinicians Who Provide Abortions: The Thinning Ranks, 80 OBSrETMcs & GYNECOLOGY, 719, 721
(1992) (noting a dramatic decrease in abortion practitioners and calling on communities to
protect these providers)).
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clinicians; otherwise ... the legacy of Roe v. Wade may become an
empty promise."3
126
Since the privacy interests at stake in Valenzuela were so vital, Justice
Spector concluded the appeals court was correct in upholding the
injunction.'27 He determined that the restriction of the defendants'
right to engage in expressive conduct was valid because it allowed
other types of picketing, and the injunction also protected the
defendants' right to express their views through alternative chan-
nels.128
In striking the injunction, however, the majority of the Valenzuela
Court concluded that the Aquino's failed to request the elements of
the intrusion upon seclusion tort be submitted to the jury.129
Nevertheless, the Valenzuela case demonstrates how a doctor may
bring a viable cause of action for an intrusion upon seclusion in Texas
or other jurisdictions, if the facts are similar and the plaintiffs
counsel presents the arguments.130  The dissenting opinions in
Valenzuela pointed out the importance of the tort in the context of
doctors who perform abortions, and other courts could certainly
follow their reasoning.'1'
C. False Light
A second invasion of privacy cause of action concerns publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye.8 2 The tort was
126. 1& at 524-25 (Spector, J., dissenting) (quoting Grimes, supra note 125, at 721-22).
Justice Spector noted that 83% of counties in the United States have no identified abortion
provider. Id.
127. Id. at 525 (Spector, J. dissenting) (concluding without discussion that the court of
appeals properly decided the damages issue).
128. Id. Justice Spector did not suggest other methods of expression through which the anti-
abortion protestors could vent their speech, but he noted earlier that Dr. Aquino's place of
business had been regularly picketed for nearly six years. Id. at 514.
129. Valenzuela v. Acquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. 1993).
130. Id. at 514. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed only the Court of Appeals' decision to
set aside the monetary damages. Id. The court remanded for a new trial in "all other respects."
Id The court feared that the plaintiff"may have believed it unnecessary to assert claims alterna-
tive to negligent infliction of emotional distress," relying on the prior holding in St. Elizabeth's
Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987) which allowed a claim for negligent infliction
of emotional distress. 853 S.W.2d at 514. However, in Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 594 (Tex.
1993), which came down the same day as Valenzuela, the court overruled Garrard, holding that
no general duty exists in Texas to avoid negligently inflicting emotional distress on others. A
plaintiff can only recover for emotional distress in connection with a defendant's breach of some
duty. 855 S.W.2d at 594.
131. 853 S.W.2d at 514-25. The court was divided five to four with three dissenting opinions
that seem to go out of their way to explain how a plaintiff might recover on the facts presented.
In fact, the dissenting opinions comprise more than 85% of the text.
132. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 7, at 863 (defining the false light tort). Nebraska,
NewYork, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wisconsin have adopted a false light cause of action through
statute. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to 20-211 (1987); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-52
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conceived to provide redress for the person who suffers indignity and
embarrassment because a part of his or her life had been falsely publi-
cized. 3 According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the
false light tort is comprised of three separate elements: there must
be a publication placing the plaintiff in a false light; the publication
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and the author must
have acted with knowledge of the falsity or with reckless disregard as
to the falsity of the publicized matterI 4
(McKinney 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 9-1-28.1 (1985); UTAH CODEANN. § 45-3-1 (1988); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 895.50 (West 1977). Presently, 19 states and the District of Columbia have adopted the
tort through cases, relying on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E. See Godbehere v.
Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 788 (Ariz. 1989) (adopting the false light tort
delineated in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E); Dodrill v.Arkansas Democrat Co.,
590 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Ark. 1980) (holding that the actual malice standard applies to a false light
claim); Fellows v. Nat'l Enquirer, Inc., 721 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. 1986) (holding that to successfully
state a false light cause of action, the plaintiff must allege that s/he was placed in a false light
that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-
American, 448 A.2d 1317, 1330 (Conn. 1982) joiningjurisdictions that recognize the false light
claim under the actual malice standard); Baker v. Burlington, Inc., 587 P.2d 829, 832 (Idaho
1978) (holding that a false light claim cannot be brought unless there is some public disclosure
of falsity concerning the plaintiff); Lovgren v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Princeton, 534 N.E.2d 987,
990 (111. 1989) (stating that Illinois requires a plaintiff to show that the person was placed in a
false light before the public that would be highly offensive to a reasonable plaintiff); Wolf v.
Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213, 1216-17 (D.C. 1989) (adopting the four invasion of privacy torts as
described in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d
816, 822 (Iowa 1978) (adopting the four invasion of privacy torts as discussed in THE
RFSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652); Dotson v. McMlaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 6 (Kan. 1975)(adopting the four invasion of privacy torts described in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 652); Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792, 795 (Me. 1976) (adopting the four invasion of privacy
torts articulated in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652); Lawrence v. A.S. Abell Co.,
475 A.2d 448, 451 (Md. 1982) (adopting the four invasion of privacy torts articulated in THE
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652); Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So.2d
77, 79 (Miss. 1986) (holding plaintiff could not claim a false light tort for a newspaper article
reporting his arrest for driving while intoxicated); Schoneweis v. Dando, 435 N.W.2d 666, 670(Neb. 1989) (stating that Nebraska recognizes the false light tort described in THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E); Romaine v. Kallinger, 537 A.2d 284, 290 (NJ. 1988) (noting that
while New Jersey recognizes the false light tort, the truth is a total defense to such a claim);
McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737, 739 (Okla. 1980) (adopting the false
light tort described in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E); Neish v. Beaver
Newspapers, Inc., 581 A.2d 619,624 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that the publisher must have
had knowledge or acted in reckless disregard for a plaintiff to prevail in a false light claim);
Montgomery Ward v. Shope, 286 N.W.2d 806, 808 n.1 (S.D. 1979) (adopting the privacy torts
described in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652); Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co.,
793 S.W.2d 329,331 (Tex. App. 1990) (holding that Texas recognizes the false light tort claim);
Eastwood v. Cascade Broadcasting Co., 722 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Wash. 1986) (adopting the false
light tort described in THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E); Crump v. Beckley
Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 83 (W.Va. 1984) (adopting the false light tort articulated in
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E).
133. See Prosser, supra note 94, at 398-400; Bryan R. Lasswell, Note, In Defense of False Light:
Why False Light Must Remain a Viable Cause of Action, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 149, 152 (1993) (arguing
that the false light tort, while largely neglected, should be further explored before courts allow
the claim to perish).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
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Although there is some overlap between the false light tort and
defamation, the two actions are distinct.135 First, the false light tort
need not be defamatory, and it can in fact be laudatory."6 Second,
the interests protected by each tort are different.1 7  While
defamation protects the plaintiff's reputation, false light secures the
plaintiff's right to be left alone."3 Third, a false light claimant must
show the falsity was widely publicized, whereas, a defamatory
statement need only be published to a single person."9
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has treated the two claims
differently. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the first of an important
line of cases dealing with defamation, the Supreme Court introduced
the "actual malice" standard for recovery of damages." The
standard requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard
of whether [the statement] was false or not."'4 ' Since the New York
Times plaintiff was a public official, the Supreme Court did not
address the question of whether a different standard would apply to
a private plaintiff." In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court held
that where the plaintiff was a private individual, states were free to
establish any standard of liability, as long as they did not impose strict
135. Prosser, supra note 94, at 400.
136. Prosser, supra note 94, at 400. See also Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 385 n. 9 (1967).
Laudatory false light recognizes that the mere publication of a false impression can be
damaging to a plaintiff whether or not it is technically defamatory. In order to recover
in defamation, a plaintiff must prove that the communication lower[ed] him in the
estimation of the community or... [would] deter third persons from associating or
dealing with him. By contrast, in a false light cause of action, the plaintiff must prove
that the statement is false, and that the plaintiff was portrayed in a manner that would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Lasswell, supra note 133, at 152.
137. See generally Prosser, supra note 94, at 400-01 (noting that while plaintiffi may have valid
claims for both torts, false light is a broader cause of action than defamation); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
138. Lasswell, supra note 133, at 154.
139. SeeProsser, supra note 94, at 400; RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. b (1977)
(defining the false light tort).
140. 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (striking an Alabama state statute that allowed public officials
to bring libel suits against critics without a showing of malice).
141. Id. at 279-80 (noting a long line of state cases upholding a similar rule).
142. SeeCurtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,155 (1967) (extending the actual malice
standard from public officials to public figures and holding that a football coach accused of
accepting bribes is a public figure for libel purposes).
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liability." Most states responded by establishing a negligence
standard for defamation cases involving private individuals.'
On the other hand, regarding the proper standard in a false light
claim, the Supreme Court held in Time v. Hill that when the alleged
falsehood is a matter of public concern, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant published the statement with knowledge of the falsity
or in reckless disregard of the truth." The plaintiff, therefore,
must meet the actual malice standard in order to recover for damages
stemming from the false statements.' Notably, Time was decided
a few years before Gertz, 47 and the Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to revisit Time to determine whether Gertz has any effect
on the standard to be used in a false light claim.' If Gertz did
apply, a private plaintiff need only show the defendant acted
negligently as to the falsity of the publicized matter. 49 As it stands,
however, a private plaintiff still must meet the actual malice standard,
and thus has a more difficult time winning a false light claim as
compared to a defamation claim. 5°
A doctor who performs abortions could bring a false light cause of
action against pro-life activists for statements contained in wanted
posters.'-' To succeed, a doctor would first have to show that the
143. 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974) (recognizing a more equitable approach to the competing
concerns of the state's interest in compensating victims and the free press' First Amendment
interest). Geriz held that a private plaintiff could recover only restricted damages from a
defendant. Id at 350. If the plaintiff and the matter concerned are considered private, then
actual and punitive damages can be recovered, absent a showing of actual malice. Id. at 347-48.
See also Dun & Bradstreet, v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985) (holding that false
statements about a contractor in a credit report did not involve public concerns requiring
application of the actual malice standard).
144. See RODNEY A. SMOLIA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 3-22 (1991) (noting that 39 jurisdictions
utilize a negligence standard).
145. 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967) (involving a report by Time, Inc., the publisher of Life
Magazine, that a Broadway play was based on actual experiences of a family's suffering at the
hands of criminals). The family brought suit alleging that this portrayal violated their right to
privacy as defined in N.Y. Ci. RIGHTS § 50-51 (McKinney 1976). 385 U.S. at 376. The Supreme
Court set aside the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff holding that the defendant was
entitled to ajury instruction on the "knowing or reckless falsity" standard. Id.
146. Id at 398.
147. Time was decided in 1967 and Certz was decided in 1974.
148. Cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 249 (1974) (finding that the facts in
Cantrdldid not present the issue of whether the Time knowing falsity/reckless disregard for the
truth standard applies to all false light cases). The trial judge in Cantre/ instructed the jury that
liability for publishing false information about the plaintiffs family could be imposed only if thejury found that the defendant published false information with a "knowing or reckless
falsehood." I&
149. If Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) applied, the plaintiff
could recover more damages if the matter was considered a purely private one. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS advocates the actual malice standard, regardless of the type
of plaintiff or matter. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977).
150. See Lasswell, supra note 133, at 137 (comparing false light and defamation claims).
151. See supra Section I (describing typical wanted posters).
Spring 1996] PRIVACY PROTECTION FOR DOCTORS
posters were widely distributed, so the matter is regarded as substan-
tially certain to become one of public knowledge.152 Secondly, the
doctor would have to show that statements on the poster placed him
or her in a false light that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.'53 Finally, if the alleged false statements on the posters are
considered matters of public concern, according to Time, a doctor
would have to show the pro-life activists acted with actual malice. 154
On the other hand, if Gertz applies, the doctor would only have to
show the activists acted negligently. 5
In Van Duyn v. Smith, an Illinois appellate court applied the Time
"actual malice" standard to a false light claim brought by the
executive director of an abortion clinic. 156 The director's complaint
alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, and invasion
of privacy in the form of the false light tort. 57 The court upheld
her cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress,
but decided the libel and invasion of privacy actions were properly
dismissed in the lower court.5 8
The defendant in Van Duyn had, on numerous occasions, requested
that Van Duyn quit her position as executive director of the clinic;
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977) (noting that communication
of a fact "... concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even a small group will
not constitute an invasion of privacy.").
153. Id. cmt. c.
154. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387 (1967) (defining actual malice as "knowledge that the
statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth.").
155. Gertzv. RobertWelch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (holding that states can determine
for themselves what standard to use in determining whether a publisher or broadcaster has
defamed a private individual). See also infra notes 229-35 and accompanying text (discussing why
doctors should not be considered public figures and why Gertz should apply).
156. 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1016 (Il1. App. 1988) (holding that abortion is a matter of public con-
cern).
157. Id. at 1006.
158. Id, at 1012, 1015-16. In explaining why the libel action was properly dismissed, the
court first determined the statements were not libelous per se, because in using the word
"killing," the defendant did not impute the commission of a criminal offense. Id. at 1014. The
court reasoned that the average reader would easily recognize the poster as pro-life propaganda
and realize that the central theme was that abortion was murder and the plaintiff was in some
way connected with abortion. Id. The court decided that when the statements were considered
within the social context, the use of the word "killing" was simply a means to describe the
defendant's opinion of the results of an abortion. 527 N.E.2d at 1014. Because the Supreme
Court has recognized a constitutional privilege for the expression of opinions, and the
determination of whether a statement is an opinion is a matter of law, defendant's statements
were not libelous and were protected by the First Amendment. Id. (citing Gertz v. Welch, 418
U.S. 323 (1974)). The court found the wanted posters portraying the doctor as a murderer to
be "repulsive, explicit, unnecessary and in bad taste." Id. Nevertheless, the court held that
"under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seen, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas." Id. (quoting Gertz v. Wekh, 418 U.S. at 339-40). See also Sloan
v. Hatton, 383 N.E.2d 259, 260 (1978) (stating that"... opinions andjudgments may be harsh
or critical-even abusive-yet still not subject the speaker or writer to civil liability.").
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followed Van Duyn in her car; interfered with her getting in and out
of the local airport; picketed her residence and the clinic at which she
worked; confronted her at her residence and at the clinic; and
distributed a wanted poster in conjunction with a "Face the American
Holocaust" poster to Van Duyn's friends, neighbors, and acquaintan-
ces near her home. 5 The wanted poster included statements that
Van Duyn was wanted for murder in violation of the Hippocratic
Oath,16° participated in killing for profit, presided over 50,000
killings, and used as a weapon a "small round suction machine that
tears the developing child limb from limb."'6 ' The "Face the
American Holocaust" poster contained pictures of aborted fetuses of
about 5-7 months gestational age.162  Under each picture a "cause
of death" was listed such as salt poisoning and total dismember-
ment. 63  The poster also contained information describing the
discovery of some 17,000 fetuses stored in a three-and-a-half ton
container in California, but failed to link that information to Van
Duyn. 1
Regarding Van Duyn's claim of false light, the court determined
that Time was the applicable case because abortion was a matter of
public concern. " According to the court, therefore, a negligence
standard was not proper in this cause of action; instead, Van Duyn
was required to satisfy the New York Times actual malice standard. 66
The court found the false light claim was properly dismissed because
Van Duyn had not satisfied this standard; her complaint alleged only
a cause of action in negligence. 6
7
159. 527 N.E.2d at 1007. Cf Valenzuela v. Aquino, 853 S.W.2d 512, 521 (1993) (discussing
how anti-abortion protestors followed Dr. Aquino's wife when she left home).
160. See LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, ANCIENT MEDICINE 6 (Owesi Temkin & C. Lilian Temkin eds.
& C. Lilian Temkin trans.) (TheJohns Hopkins Paperback ed. 1987) (translating the Hippocrat-
ic Oath to read "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody... [nor] give to a woman an
abortive remedy").
161. Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (Il. App. 1988).
162. Id. (finding that the posters resembled wanted posters used by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
163. I.
164. Id. at 1016 (noting that there was no cross-referencing within the poster linking Van
Duyn to the fetuses).
165. Id. at 1016 (rejecting Van Duyn's argument that the Gertz standard should apply).
166. Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1016 (Il1. App. 1988). The court noted that the
Supreme Court in Gertzspecifically excluded the Timedecision from its consideration, therefore,
the negligence standard did not apply, even though the false light claim was between two private
individuals. Id. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text (discussing NewYork Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and the application of the actual malice standard to a false light
claim).
167. Van Duyn, 527 N.E.2d at 1016 (holding that an "actual malice" standard was not
required to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and that
the allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action on that basis). The court affirmed only
the dismissal of the false light claim and reversed the lower court's other holdings, remanding
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The Van Duyn case demonstrates two important points. First,
relying on the fact that Time v. Hill held that a private plaintiff must
satisfy the actual malice standard when the alleged falsehood is a
matter of public concern,"6 the Van Duyn court held that abortion
is a matter of public concern, therefore, Van Duyn was required to
meet that standard in order to bring a successful claim.'69 That may
be true, but the alleged falsehoods in the wanted posters were not
about abortion; they were about Van Duyn17 ° The falsehoods at
issue were statements implicating Van Duyn as a wanted person
because she was a "killer" who violated the Hippocratic Oath.
171
Furthermore, these statements, when read in conjunction with the
"Face the American Holocaust" poster, in fact connected Van Duyn
with the discovery of 17,000 fetuses in a large container in California.
The Van Duyn court rejected the notion that the "Face the American
Holocaust" poster implicated Van Duyn because the poster did not
refer to her, contained no cross-referencing, and dealt with an event
that occurred in Los Angeles.Y12 The fact that these two signs were
posted together, however, means the public will see them at the same
time. Overall, the Van Duyn court took a superficial glance at the
situation and automatically viewed it as a pro-life/pro-choice debate
about abortion instead of seeing the real issue: pro-life harassment
of the executive director of a clinic where abortions were
provided. 3
The Van Duyn court's analysis is important for a second reason. In
order to maintain a successful false light claim, a doctor may be
required to satisfy the actual malice standard; that is, she or he may
have to prove that the pro-life activist responsible for the posters knew
the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard of the
truth. 4  However, the proper standard for a false light cause of
for further findings. Id
168. Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967).
169. Van Duyn, 527 N.E.2d at 1016.
170. 1I at 1015 (noting that the wanted poster referred to Van Duyn's practice of abortion).
171. I& at 1007 (pointing out that the defendant's posters claimed that Van Duyn also
violated the Geneva Code).
172. Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1015 (Ill. App. 1988) (noting that the poignant
reference to the 1982 "Woodland Hills Find" of 17,000 aborted fetuses in a large storage
container in Woodland Hills, California has been strategically used in an attempt to persuade
the middle majority to join the anti-abortion leagues).
173. Id. at 1012.
174. SeeTime v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,398 (1967) (striking legislation utilizing a standard lower
than actual malice).
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action should be a negligence standard as already applied by many
states in defamation claims involving private plaintiffs. 17
As the Van Duyn court noted, the Supreme Court excluded the Time
decision from its consideration in Gertz, but that is because a false
light claim was not before it.' 76 The exclusion in no way affirms
that the Time standard must apply to false light claims involving
private plaintiffs. 77 Just as Justice Powell was concerned that many
deserving defamation plaintiffs would be unable to meet the exacting
actual malice standard,78 so too are many deserving false light
plaintiffs unable to meet the standard. There simply is no logic
behind a lower standard for defamation; the reasoning in Gertz applies
just as well to a false light claim.
First, in Gertz, the Supreme Court held that because private
individuals characteristically have less effective opportunities for
rebuttal than do public figures, they are more vulnerable to injury
from defamation.179  It follows that private citizens are just as
susceptible to injury from matters placing them in a false light.
Furthermore, private plaintiffs making false light claims have no more
voluntarily exposed themselves to injury than a private defamation
plaintifflm Finally, no intelligible reason can be given to explain
why the state's interest in compensating a violation of one's right to
be left alone is any less important than the interest in compensating
an injury to one's reputation.' The false light claim is aimed at
protecting the plaintiff's dignity 82  As one defender of the
negligence standard explained:
While the private person's reputation may not be subject to as
much harm by the publication of a falsehood as that of a public
person, the damage to a private person's dignity can be subject to
an exponentially greater harm because that person never sought
the limelight in the first place. The sense of embarrassment is
175. See infra notes 227-59 and accompanying text (discussing why doctors should be
considered private plaintiffs and not public figures).
176. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974) (taking note of Time v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967)).
177. Id. at 348.
178. Id. at 349 (noting the need to balance the competing interests of the protection of
individual privacy with the First Amendment).
179. Md at 344. The Court noted, however, that even a mere opportunity to rebut a false-
hood rarely undoes the harm inflicted. Id. at 334 n.9.
180. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (holding that this element
weighed in the totality even more than the chance for rebuttal).
181. Id. at 345.
182. Lasswell, supra note 133, at 175.
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compounded by the fact that the plaintiff has been presented in a
highly offensive manner. 3
Because a false light claim is just as important as a defamation claim,
private plaintiffs should be afforded a lower standard in order to
properly remedy a violation of the right to be left alone. In Van Duyn
v. Smith, therefore, the Illinois court should not have affirmed the
dismissal of the false light claim. As this case demonstrates, without
the lower negligence standard, many deserving doctors will simply
have no redress for the harm caused by pro-life publications of
offensive material placing them in a false light.
Although such a lower negligence standard would be much easier
for a doctor to satisfy, there are some avenues a doctor could pursue
in order to meet the actual malice standard. One type of claim could
center on the number of abortions a targeted doctor is said to have
performed. 4 Actual malice would be proven by evidence showing
that the defendant made no effort to verify the number or
demonstrating that the defendant purposefully exaggerated the
numbers. A doctor could also focus on the "modus operandi"
described in many wanted posters, if he or she could show the
descriptions to be those of commonly known outdated procedures.
A false light claim could be a significant weapon for doctors in the
battle against pro-life exposure. The elements are not impossible to
meet, and good argument can be made that the actual malice
standard should be lowered to a negligence one. If a doctor is in fact
successful in maintaining a false light cause of action and damages are
awarded, a pro-life activist may think twice before placing false
statements on wanted posters portraying a certain doctor's name and
photograph.
D. Public Disclosure of Private Facts
A third invasion of privacy action is the tort of public disclosure of
private facts.sS This tort creates a cause of action for the offensive
183. Lasswell, supra note 133, at 161.
184. For example, in Van Duyn, the wanted poster stated that Van Duyn had "presided over
50,000 killings." 527 N.E.2d at 1007. It would be relatively easy to show that number false. Van
Duyn could satisfy the actual malice standard by showing the author had acted in reckless
disregard of the truth by not verifying the number or by exaggerating the number to an
outrageous amount knowing the figures to be inaccurate.
185. Thirty-fourjurisdictions recognize the private facts tort. See MASS. ANN. LAWs 214, § lb
(Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1995); KI. GEN. LAWs § 9-1-28.1 (1985 & Supp. 1994); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994);Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507,
508 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (holding that a newspaper's publication of plaintiffs name,
address and other identifying information as part of an account that plaintiff has been cleared
of criminal charges did not constitute an invasion of privacy); Boyd v. Thompson Newspaper
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publicity of any truthful private information about the plaintiff.186
According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the private facts
Publishing Co., 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1020, 1022 (W.D. Ark. 1980) (noting that the state of
Arkansas has recognized the tort of invasion of privacy); Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824, 831(Ala. 1973) (concluding that a doctor's unauthorized disclosure of a patient's medical record
violates the patient's right of privacy); Pegerv. Sullivan, 432 P.2d 593,596 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1967)(stating that Arizona recognizes the tort of invasion of privacy); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d
716, 725 (Cal. 1980) (acknowledging California's recognition of the tort of public disclosure of
private facts); Lincoln v. Denver Post, Inc., 501 P.2d 152, 153-54 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972) (noting
the limitations of plaintiff's right to prevent public disclosure of private facts); LaFontaine v.Family Drug Stores, Inc., 360 A.2d 899, 902 (Conn. C.P. 1976) (stating that plaintiff could
recover if she were to establish that defendant publicly disclosed a private fact); Barbieri v. News-
Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773, 774 (Del. 1963) (adopting the tort of invasion of privacy whichincludes public disclosure of private facts); Cason v. Baskin, 20 So.2d 243, 249 (Fla. 1944)(holding that the tort of invasion of privacy exists and explaining that this tort includes the
"'publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern'" (citation
omitted)); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (accepting Dean
Prosser's analysis that the tort of invasion of privacy includes public disclosure of private facts);
Taylorv. K.T.V.B., Inc., 525 P.2d 984,985 (Idaho 1974) (recognizing public disclosure of privatefacts as part of the tort of invasion of privacy); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979) (noting limitations on liability for public disclosure of private
facts); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 543 P.2d 988, 991 (Kan. 1975) (categorizing
plaintiff's claim as tort of public disclosure of private facts); Wheeler v. P. Sorenson Mfg. Co.,
415 S.W.2d 582, 584 (Ky. 1967) (stating that Kentucky recognizes that a person has a right tobe free from unwarranted interference into his or her private life); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979) (explaining that the right of privacy includes
protection from "unreasonable public disclosure of embarrassing private facts"); Nelson v. Maine
Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977) (noting that it previously recognized the tort of public
disclosure of private facts); Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421, 424 (Md. 1976) (explaining that
liability will exist if publicity was given to plaintiff's life); Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522,531 (Mich. 1977) (defining the tort of invasion of privacy through public disclosure of
embarrassing private facts); Martin v. Dorton, 50 So.2d 391, 393 (Miss. 1951) (implying that aprivate facts tort would protect private person even though a public officer's privacy is not
invaded); Corcoran v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 572 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo. CL App. 1978)(describing the plaintiff's claim as one of "public disclosure of private facts"); McNutt v. NewMexico State Tribune Co., 538 P.2d 804, 807-08 (N.M. CL App. 1975) (stating that New Mexico
recognizes four torts of invasion of privacy, including public disclosure of private facts); Shibley
v. Time, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 791, 794 (Ohio 1974) (recognizing tort of public disclosure of private
facts); McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737, 739 (Okla. 1980) (characterizing
a claim as one of public disclosure of private fact); Hamilton v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 423 P.2d771, 772-73 (Or. 1967) (acknowledging the tort of public disclosure of private facts while
limiting its breadth); Marks v. Bell Tel Co., 331 A.2d 424, 430 (Pa. 1975) (explaining that public
disclosure of private facts is an analytically distinct tort); Meetze v. Associated Press, 95 S.E.2d
606, 609 (S.C. 1956) (accepting generally the tort of invasion of privacy which includes public
disclosure of private facts); Truxes v. Kenco Enters., Inc., 119 N.W.2d 914, 916-17 (S.D. 1963)(suggesting thatpublic disclosure of private facts is actionable); Industrial Found. v. Texas Indus.
Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex. 1976) (recognizing the tort of and characterizing the
claim as "public disclosure of embarrassing private facts").
Although silent in the state courts, federal courts in New Hampshire, Vermont and West
Virginia recognize the private facts tort. See, e.g., Buckley v. W.E.N.H. T.V., 5 Media L. Rep.(BNA) 1509, 1510 (D.N.H. 1979) (recognizing the private facts tort); Dubree v. Assoc. of Trial
Lawyers, 6 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1158, 1159 (D. Vt. 1980) (determining that, while Vermont has
not yet spoken on the matter, the court would follow the majority ofjurisdictions and recognize
the tort); Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 F. Supp. 93, 95 (S.D.W. Va. 1968)(noting that West Virginia generally recognizes claims of invasion of privacy).
186. SeeWILLuAM L. PROSSER, LAW OFTORTS, § 117, at 809 (4th ed. 1971) (defining a general
standard for the tort of public disclosure of private facts), cited in Industrial Found. v. Texas
Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex. 1976).
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tort is limited to publicity given to private matters that would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person and to information that is not
of legitimate concern to the public.'
8 7
A doctor who performs abortions could use this tort to bring a
claim against pro-life activists for the publicity given to his or her
private life through the distribution of wanted posters."8 While a
false light claim would focus on the poster's falsities, such as inflam-
matory language that describes the doctor as a "killer" or the
fraudulent number of abortions she or he has performed, a private
facts cause of action would concentrate on the truthful information
highlighted in the poster. A doctor could bring a private facts claim
if pro-life activists distributed wanted posters detailing information
about unrelated charges against the doctor, such as any malpractice
suits that may have been brought.'89 Likewise, a doctor could bring
a private facts claim if pro-life activists published personal information
about the doctor, such as the fact the doctor performs abortions; his
or her home address, phone number, and car tag number; and places
the doctor frequently visits.
A pro-life activist would be subject to liability for invasion of the
doctor's privacy if the information publicized would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and is not of legitimate concern to
the public. 9 ° In the case of a rap sheet type of wanted poster, the
thrust of the message is that the doctor is a negligent physician
because of the number of malpractice suits brought against him or
her.9' These wanted posters may also depict the doctor as a
lawbreaker by announcing any criminal charges that have been
brought against him or her, such as criminal negligence or failure to
keep proper drug records.'92 A typical poster will detail any suit or
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). "One who gives publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public." Id.
188. See infra Appendix B (describing a typical wanted poster).
189. See supra part I.B (describing the "No Place to Hide" campaign's use of wanted posters
containing alleged malpractice claims).
190. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (stating that the information must
be both highly offensive and of no legitimate concern to the public in order to constitute an
invasion of privacy).
191. SeeSherlock, supra note 14, at 4-1 to 4-10, 10-2 to 10-3 (instructing anti-abortion activists
to publicize malpractice cases against abortion providers). See also Nancy Cleveland, Abortion
Wars: Confronting Doctors; Many Buckle Under Pressure, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 6, 1993, at
Al (describing efforts by anti-abortion groups to publicize malpractice suits brought against
doctors who perform abortions).
192. See Sherlock, supra note 14, at 5-1 to 5-8 (instructing anti-abortion activists to uncover
the criminal records of doctors who perform abortions).
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charge, even if the doctor was not found liable, if the charges were
dropped, or if the case was settled.19 3
Given the standard for invasion of privacy set forth in the RES-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,194 the information made public in
pro-life wanted posters seems to be exactly the type of public
disclosure at which the private facts tort is aimed. It may be difficult,
however, for a doctor to base a private facts claim on this type of
information, because it may not satisfy all of the elements of a private
facts tort. Although a typical wanted poster would likely be consid-
ered a public disclosure, 95 a wanted poster may not be considered
an invasion of privacy since, for reasons of consumer protection, the
public arguably has a legitimate interest in the matters publicized.
Therefore, the doctor's private facts claim would not satisfy subsection
(b) of the RESTATEMENT'S invasion of privacy standard, which requires
that the information be of no legitimate concern to the public.19
On the other hand a doctor may argue that only successful
malpractice claims and convictions of criminal activity are of real
importance to the public. The fact that a doctor may have twenty
malpractice claims pending against him or her has little significance,
unless the doctor is found negligent or reckless. In fact, some pro-life
activists have brought frivolous malpractice claims against doctors in
order to injure their reputations, and then in turn1 97 use the
allegations as evidence that the doctor is a dangerous physician. 9
Even if the material announced in a wanted poster is of "no legitimate
interest" and, therefore, satisfies subsection (b) of the RESTATEMENT'S
invasion of privacy standard, the poster may still not meet the
193. See infra Appendix B (describing the charges made in a typical wanted poster).
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (providing that the information
constituting invasion of privacy must be both highly offensive and of no legitimate concern to
the public).
195. See Md. at cmt. a (defining publicity to mean a "matter... made public by communicat-
ing it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." Thus, the standard for what
constitutes "publication" is relatively low. In at least somejurisdictions, a private communication
between a few people is sufficient.).
Aposter probably would be considered a"public disclosure," given pro-life efforts to distribute
many flyers so that the community knows about the practices of abortion providers. See OR's
No Place to Hide, supra note 15. Wanted signs are often posted and distributed in and around
a doctor's neighborhood including schools and shopping, while posters, listing a doctor's
malpractice record, among other things, often are distributed to women and their families and
friends as they enter and exit clinics where abortions are performed. ATLANTA PRO-CHOICE
ACTION COMMITTEE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND PROMOTION OF MURDER BYANTI-ABORTION AcrivsTs
1 (1993) [hereinafter APAG].
196. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (1977).
197. Rochelle, supra note 27, at 10 (describing attempts by anti-abortion groups to bring
malpractice suits against doctors to prevent them from performing abortions).
198. Rochelle, supra note 27, at 10.
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requirements of a private facts tort. Although a reasonable person
would be likely to find such information highly offensive, the facts
disclosed may not be considered private facts because they are matters
of public record.199 However, given the current climate surroun-
ding the abortion debate, compelling arguments can be made to
protect such information regarding doctors."°° Thus, a doctor may
have a difficult time recovering when his or her private facts cause of
action is focused on public information about civil claims or criminal
charges against him or her.
However, a doctor has a greater opportunity at making a successful
private facts claim if she or he focuses on the personal information
publicized in the wanted poster such as his or her name and the
identification of him or her as a doctor who performs abortions.2 '
A doctor who bases a private facts tort cause of action on the private
details of his or her life will likely be more successful in proving his
or her claim because the elements of the tort are easier to meet.
2 2
Just as with the wanted posters which read like rap sheets, the
publicity requirement would be plainly met.20 3 Moreover, since the
focus of the claim would be personal material, a doctor would not be
concerned with the question of whether the information is in fact
private. Given the increase in violent incidents against doctors in
recent years, most doctors fervently try to conceal their names and
identities.2" Most doctors who perform abortions have unlisted
phone numbers, many drive several different cars to the clinics where
they work, and some even wear disguises when entering the clinic.0"
199. See, e.g., Sherlock, supra note 14, at Forward ("It took me quite a while to cut through
the cobwebs, the fog and the red tape surrounding the public records, but once I did, I was
pleasantly surprised .. ."). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that where matters of public
record are made public, such publicity does not constitute an invasion of privacy. See Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 493-95 (1975) ("'There is no liability when the
defendant merely gives further publicity to... facts which are matters of public record .... )
(citation omitted).
200. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (claiming that the number of doctors who
perform abortions is rapidly declining). See, e.g., Diane Hurth, Pensacola Haunted by History of
Violence in Abortion Debate: Life and Death: Violence and the Anti-Abortion Movement, SUN-SENTINEL,
July 23, 1995, atAl (reporting that threats of violence against abortion providers have continued
in Pensacola since Dr. Gunn's murder); Deborah Schoch, Frightened Physicians Slaying of Florida
Prompts Local Debate Over 'Wanted' Flyers Used by Abortion Foes, LA TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993, at B3
(describing targeted doctors fear of violence by abortion foes).
201. See infra appendix B (describing the contents of typical wanted posters).
202. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652D (1977) (listing the elements of an invasion
of privacy).
203. See id. at cmt. a (defining publicity).
204. State Report-California: Bay Area Docs Fear, Harassment, Violence, American Political
Network, Inc., Abortion Report, Mar. 24, 1993, available in Wesdaw, APN-AB database
[hereinafter "APN-AB State Report'] (quoting a Northern California abortion provider who
claimed that doctors have been keeping lower profiles since Dr. Gunn was murdered).
205. APAC, supra note 195, at 3.
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Therefore, any publicity given to a doctor's identity or the dis-
semination of any information revealing his or her name could easily
be viewed as a disclosure of a private fact.
The private facts tort is limited, however, to those matters that are
highly offensive to the reasonable person and are of no legitimate
concern to the public.0 6 A reasonable person may not find the
publication of his or her name, address, telephone number, and
occupation highly offensive. However, when such information is
disclosed along with inflammatory information about the doctor,
including unproven allegations described in gruesome language, a
reasonable person may indeed be offended.
Finally, such private information would be of no legitimate concern
to the public.0 7 The substance of the abortion debate is certainly
of legitimate interest to the public and therefore deserves full
publicity.20  However, private information about individual doctors
performing the abortion procedure does not similarly merit such
publicity.209 These physicians vigorously try to keep out of the
public eye, and they do not openly involve themselves in the
debate. 0 Therefore, their private lives, especially details outside
the medical duties as physicians, are of no legitimate concern to the
general public.21'
Wanted posters publicizing doctors who perform abortions have yet
to be the subject of an invasion of privacy suit.2 12  However, as
National Bonding Agency v. Demeson2t1 demonstrates, at least one case
involving a wanted poster and the private facts tort confirms that
bringing such a suit can be successful. In National Bonding Agency v.
Demeson, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the publication of a
wanted poster constituted an actionable intentional invasion of the
206. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) (stating the elements for an
invasion of privacy claim).
207. See id. (listing the elements for the tort of invasion of privacy).
208. See, e.g., Peter Eisler, Videotape: Latest Weapon Against Clinic Violence, SALT LAKE Tim.,
Aug. 21, 1994, at A15 (reporting that Planned Parenthood publicized a video in which anti-
abortion leaders preach violence in order to underscore the threat posed by groups like
Operation Rescue).
209. See, e.g., State Reports Florida: Pensacola City Council Votes to Retain Buffer Zone, American
Political Network, Inc., Abortion Report, July 25, 1995, available in Weslaw, APN-AB database
[hereinafter APN-AB Florida Report] ("Doctors who perform Pensacola abortions are.., publicly
nameless and move about covertly.")
210. SeeAPN-AB State Report, supra note 204 (describing efforts byabortion providers to avoid
publicity).
211. See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text (discussing why a doctor's private life is
of no legitimate concern to the public).
212. Search of WESTAW, Allcases library, U.S. file (Jan. 12, 1996).
213. 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
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right to privacy."4 Demeson, the plaintiff in the case, brought suit
against a bonding agency for publicly disclosing private facts about
her in a wanted poster 15 The poster in question contained a
picture of Demeson, described her as a bond jumper, and referred to
her sexual habits. 2 6  A jury awarded Demeson damages and court
costs for the invasion.21 ' National Bonding Agency appealed,
claiming that Demeson stated no cause of action.2 8  The court
disagreed and held that Demeson not only stated, but proved an
intentional invasion of privacy claim, and the court affirmed the
judgement and damages award.22°
Demeson is important because it recognized and awarded a plaintiff
damages for the private facts tort in connection with a wanted
poster.22 Unfortunately, however, the case sheds little light on the
proper analysis of the private facts elements. 22  Because the
intrusion and false light claims were grouped with the private facts
claim, the Demeson court reached its decision without addressing the
elements of any of the torts.
21
Furthermore, the case did not discuss three defenses that are often
asserted by defendants facing private facts claims. First, a defendant
often argues that the plaintiff is a public figure and, therefore, that
any publicity about the plaintiff is not actionable.224 Second, a
defendant in a private facts suit often claims that the information
publicized is newsworthy and that, therefore, the disclosure is not only
acceptable, but necessary.2' Finally, closely related to this newswor-
thiness argument is a defense based on the First Amendment; that is,
a defendant often claims that he or she has a constitutional right to
214. Id. at 750.
215. Id. She also brought intrusion upon seclusion and false light claims. Id. at 749 n.2.
The court grouped all three of the privacy claims together addressing them as an allegation of
intentional invasion of the right of privacy. Id.
216. 648 S.W.2d at 749 n.1 (describing the wanted poster at issue).
217. Id. (awarding the plaintiff $90,500 in actual damages and $75,000 in exemplary damag-
es).
218. Id. at 749.
219. I. (underscoring that Texas recognizes an enforceable right of privacy).
220. Id. at 750.
221. National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748, 749 & n.1, 750 (Tex. Ct. App.
1983).
222. Id. at 749 (recognizing the existence of an invasion of privacy tort without elucidating
a particular invasion of privacy standard).
223. Id. at 749-50 (consolidating the three invasion of privacy tort claims).
224. See, ag., Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 543 P.2d 988, 993 (Kan. 1975)
(concluding that "public officials" and "public figures" generally relinquish their right of
privacy).
225. See, ag., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 726 (Cal. 1980) (suggesting that news-
worthiness is a defense to an invasion of privacy).
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publicize this information.226 Each of these three defenses will be
analyzed in detail below.
1. Public Figure Defense
The Supreme Court has stated that " [t] hose who, by reason of the
notoriety of their achievements or the vigor and success with which
they seek the public's attention, are properly classed as public figures
...."227 Public figures generally have assumed roles of special
prominence in the public's affairs and in the resolution of public
questions. There are two distinct categories of public figures: the
all purpose public figure and the limited purpose public figure.229
The all purpose class includes those who occupy positions of great
persuasive power and influence, 230 while the limited purpose group
includes those who have "thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved."231' Furthermore, it may be possible for
someone to become a public figure involuntarily, but such instances
"must be exceedingly rare. "232
Applying this definition of "public figure," practicing medicine does
not in itself make a doctor a public figure. 2 ' Doctors do, however,
have many opportunities to become involved in the determination of
controversial issues, making them subject to the possibility of being
deemed a limited purpose public figure.2 4 Cases involving doctors
vary widely on the question of whether they are public figures. 25
Indeed, one media attorney declared that determining who is a public
figure is, at best, "an inexact science."26 Decisions differ based on
jurisdiction, and the resolution is very fact-specific. 237
226. See, e.g., id. at 725 (recognizing that the right to privacy must often be subordinated to
the First Amendment).
227. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (holding that a newspaper cannot
claim a constitutional privilege against liability in a defamation suit where plaintiff was not a
public figure).
228. Id. at 345, 351.
229. Id. at 351.
230. Id. at 345.
231. Id,
232. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
233. See Harry Stonecipher & Don Sneed, A Survey of the Professional Person as Libel Plaintiff-
A Reexamination of the Public Figure Doctrine, 46 ARK. L. REv. 303, 322 (1993) (analyzing whether
doctors' medical duties render them public figures).
234. Id.
235. See id. ("[A] review of thirteen reported libel cases brought by doctors.., indicates that
six plaintiffs were found to be public figures, four were found not be public figures ... and
three others were stipulated to be private figures without further comment.").
236. Id. at 304 n.10 (citing ROBERT SACK, SLANDER, LIBEL, AND RELATED PROBLEMS, 204
(1980)).
237. Id. at 305.
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For example, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that a practicing
obstetrician who voluntarily pursued an appointment to the state
medical board was a limited purpose public figure.2" After learning
of the plaintiff's potential appointment, Alaska Right-to-Life published
an article making several allegations about the doctor's abortion
practices. 239 Because the qualifications of the doctor as a potential
appointee was subject to public attention and comment, she was
deemed a limited purpose public figure.2  In another case, a
doctor involved in a public controversy concerning the medical
mistreatment of a patient was held not to be a limited purpose public
• figure, although he had voluntarily given a television interview. 241
The court determined there was no evidence that the plaintiff had
assumed a position of prominence in the publicity surrounding the
alleged mistreatment, and the doctor had not invited public attention
to himself in an effort to influence others. 2
As evidenced by these cases, it is difficult to determine whether a
doctor is in fact a public figure. With the exception of the Surgeon
General,24 it is highly unlikely a doctor will be held an all purpose
public figure.2 44 In the case of most, if not all, doctors who perform
abortions, it is easy to identify them as private individuals, given their
vigorous attempts to remain unknown.2' Because of the increase
in violent incidents against doctors in recent years, most doctors
fervently try to conceal their names and identities, 246 especially
238. Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 941 (Alaska 1988) (suggesting that the doctor's limited
purpose was in her capacity as a potential appointee to the medical board which placed her in
a position of public attention).
239. Id. at 940. The article called the doctor an "abortionist" and claimed that her "methods
were so horrible as to cause a boycott by everyone employed" at the hospital in which she
worked. I&
240. 1& at 941. The plaintiff's libel action against the author of the article labeling her as
.an abortionist was, therefore, dismissed." Id. at 946.
241. Pesta v. CBS, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 166, 170 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
242. Id at 169-70.
243. See Stonecipher & Sneed, supra note 233, at 306-07 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) which defined a public figure as a person with notorious achievements or
who vigorously and successfully seeks the public's attention, and which defined an all purpose
public figure as a person who occupies a position of"such persuasive power and influence that
[she is] deemed [a] public figur[e] for all purposes"). The Surgeon General satisfies the
definition of an all purpose public figure because she is nominated by the President of the
United States to oversee issues of and promote public health concerns throughout the country.
See Baby Doctors-in-Chief Los VEGAS REVIEW JOURNAL, Feb. 12, 1995, at 02 (describing the
Surgeon General's "enormous" public role).
244. See, e.g., Stonecipher & Sneed, supra note 233, at 322 & nn. 122-23 (citing Renner v.
Donsbach, 749 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Mo. 1990) which held that, while the doctor was a public
figure, this status only applied to a limited range of issues).
245. SeeAPB-AB State ReporA supra note 204, at *1 (reporting that doctors vigorously attempt
to maintain their privacy).
246. See APB-AB State Report, supra note 204, at *4 (describing efforts by doctors to avoid
publicity).
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regarding their work at particular clinics. 247  It would be difficult,
therefore, to demonstrate that a doctor who attempts to conceal his
or her identity is a limited purpose public figure, because she or he
has not intentionally put him or herself at the forefront of a
particular public controversy in order to influence the resolution of
the issues involved.2
On the other hand, pro-life activists could argue that doctors who
perform abortions are at the heart of the abortion debate and that
they are therefore limited purpose public figures. However, while
these doctors might provide abortions, most of them try to avoid
controversy, and generally do not participate in the open debate to
try and motivate a settlement of the problems.249 Instead, many
doctors who perform abortions do so to provide a much needed
medical service, 250 not to try to resolve the debate. Although some
doctors may in fact be activists within the medical community, their
activities may not be enough to cause them to be public figures.25 '
Finally, doctors should not be deemed involuntary public figures.
Pro-life activists try to publicize and expose doctors, but this should
not be the "exceedingly rare" case where an individual unwillingly
becomes a public figure.25 2 The Gertz Court reasoned that generally
individuals become public figures voluntarily.23 Therefore, given
doctors' efforts to remain unidentified, they should be protected.5 4
If a doctor is deemed a public figure, it is not clear whether a private
facts claim will be completely barred, or if the plaintiff will have to
prove some form of the actual malice standard 255 for the defendant
247. APAC, supra note 195, at 3.
248. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (characterizing limited
purpose public figures as persons who thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public
issues to influence their resolution).
249. See APN-AB Horida Report, supra note 209 (underscoring efforts by abortion providers
to remain out of the public eye).
250. See Booth supra note 2, at AS (presenting the opinion of a doctor who refused to stop
performing abortions in spite of the increase in terrorist activities against abortion providers).
251. See Georgia Society of Plastic Surgeons, Inc. v. Anderson, 363 S.E.2d 140, 142 (Ga. 1987)
(holding that a doctor was not a public figure even though he was involved in a controversy
about whether certain medical specialists should perform plastic surgery). The court reasoned
that the debate was merely a private controversy within the medical profession and, therefore,
the doctor was not a public figure. Id. Based on this holding, the fact that a doctor may be an
activist only within the medical community and not within the general public may be an impor-
tant factor in determining whether she or he is a public figure.
252. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
253. Id
254. SeeAPN-AB FKoida Report, supra note 209, at *4 (explaining that abortion providers make
vigorous efforts to remain anonymous).
255. SeeNewYork Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964) (striking down an Alabama
rule that malice is presumed in libel actions brought by public officials against critics). The
standard requires a plaintiff to show the defendant in a defamation case acted with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether the statement was false. Id.
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to be liable.256 Even if a doctor is required to prove the disclosure
was done with malice, he or she can probably meet this burden.
When discussing their exposure campaigns, many pro-life activists
refer to driving a particular doctor out of business or making his or
her life so unbearable that she or he quits performing abortions.
57
Even if a doctor is deemed a public figure, she or he can demonstrate
malice if anti-abortion activists try to intimidate him or her since such
activity is aimed particularly at the doctor and is intended to cause
some injury." However, given the fervent efforts by doctors who
perform abortions to remain out of the public's eye, 9 they should
not be considered public figures.
2. Newsworthy Defense
Generally, a successful private facts plaintiff is able to show that the
publication of the private information was of no legitimate concern
to the public by demonstrating that the issue in question was not
newsworthy.2" What constitutes "newsworthy" information is
difficult to determine, as evidenced by the fact that most states have
not adopted explicit definitions." Courts have taken different
approaches to the determination of newsworthiness, including
balancing of First Amendment rights with the privacy interests and
designating certain types of information as "per se newsworthy," while
other subjects are considered private.2 62
256. Compare Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 307-08 (10th Cir. 1981)
(holding there is a privilege barring a private facts cause of action against a public figure absent
"extreme cases") with Kinsey v. Macur, 107 Cal. App.3d 265, 273 (1980) (recognizing same
privilege but alluding to the possibility of recovery upon a showing of actual malice).
257. See Morning Edition: Radical Anti-Abortion Movement Leaders Meet This Week (NPR radio
broadcast, Aug. 11, 1994) (1994 WL 8690168) (explaining that the strategy of the American
Coalition of Life Activists is to intimidate doctors into quitting their practices of performing
abortions).
258. See id. (reporting that anti-abortion leaders intend to make the lives of abortion
providers so unbearable that they will be driven out of business).
259. SeeAPN-AB Florida Report, supra note 209, at *4 (noting the efforts made by abortion
providers to avoid the public eye).
260. See, e.g., Forsher v. Rugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 726 (Cal. 1980) (applying the idea that news-
worthy information is of legitimate concern to the public).
261. Diane L Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291,299-301 (1983) (noting that the concept of newsworthiness
is inherently vague and that the RESTATEMENT'S definition of the right to privacy offers little
guidance to courts for determining what is newsworthy).
262. See Christine Hart, Note, Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St. Louis: Breathing Life into the
"Disclosure of PrivateFacts" Tort, 35 Sr. LouIs U.LJ. 931, 943 (1991) (explaining that in order to
determine whether a topic is newsworthy some courts have focused exclusively on the press' First
Amendment rights; other courts have focused primarily on privacy rights; still others have used
a balancing test; and others have carved out particular realms of information as per se
newsworthy).
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The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the private facts
tort;" however, two decisions implicating the private tort suggest
that the Court likely would follow a balancing approach to determine
whether a topic is newsworthy.2" In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,2" the Supreme Court faced a private facts situation, but
rather than addressing the broader issue of whether truthful
publications of private facts may ever subject the publisher to liability
consistent with the First Amendment, the Court focused on the
narrower issue of whether a state may impose sanctions for the
accurate publication of a rape victim's name legally obtained from
public records.266 The majority267 began its discussion by noting
the important role the press plays, in reporting the proceedings and
administration of government.2" Regarding judicial proceedings,
the Court discussed the significant function of the press in guaran-
teeing fairness of trials and "bring~ing] to bear the beneficial effects
of public scrutiny upon the administration ofjustice."269 The Court
concluded that because "[t] here is no liability when the defendant
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which
263. Cf Time v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,384 n.7 (1967) (recognizing the possibility of tort liability
for the publication of the truth: "This limitation to newsworthy persons and events does not of
course foreclose an interpretation of the statute to allow damages where 'Revelations may be so
intimate and so unwarranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's
notions of decency'" (citing Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
264. SeeFlorida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (holding that where a newspaper publishes
truthful information lawfully gathered, damages may be awarded only when liability is narrowly
tailored to further a state interest of the highest order); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that a state may not impose sanctions on the accurate publication of
the name of a rape victim obtained from public records).
265. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
266. Id. at 491. The defendant broadcast corporation televised a report about how the
plaintiff's daughter, the rape victim, did not survive the attack. Id. at 496. The broadcast used
the victim's full name, in violation of a Georgia statute that made it a misdemeanor to report
the names of rape victims. Id. The defendant's report was based on notes a reporter took
during criminal proceedings against the rapist and from copies of the indictments the reported
obtained during a recess in the hearing. Id. Plaintiff brought suit for, among other things,
invasion of privacy in violation of the Georgia statute. Id.
267. See id. at 497-500 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining how the Court's past treatment
of defamation law differed from the view expressed by the majority). Justice Douglas also wrote
a separate concurring opinion arguing that the Court should have taken a much broader
approach in order to find that "there is no power on the part of government to suppress or
penalize the publication ... of 'any matter of sufficient general interest to prompt media
coverage.'" 420 U.S. at 501, 501 n.* (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357 n.6 (1974)). By allowing the First Amendment to be accommodated by
individual state interests, Douglas believed that the majority had raised "a specter of liability
which must inevitably induce self-censorship by the media, thereby inhibiting the rough-and-
tumble discourse which the First Amendment so clearly protects." Id. at 501 n.*. Justice
Rhenquist dissented on the grounds that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the decision
below was not a final judgment or decree. Id. at 501-512 (Rhenquist,J., dissenting).
268. Id. at 491-492.
269. Id. at 492.
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is already public," the dissemination of public record information is
outside the realm of the private facts tort.
270
Finally, the Court explained that, by definition, information in the
public records are part of the public domain and serve the purpose
of informing those who are interested in the administration of
government.271  The Court refused to distinguish certain public
record information as being non-publishable because it could
potentially offend the sensibilities of a reasonable person. 2
According to the Court, to make such a rule would put a difficult
burden on authors to decide what is legally important enough to
publish, would invite self-censorship, and would likely lead to the
suppression of many newsworthy items.
The Supreme Court was again faced with the publication of a rape
victim's name in Florida Star v. B.JE274 The facts in this case were
a bit different from those in Cohn. The published report using the
victim's full name violated a state statute but, unlike Cohn, the report
was based on a publicly released police report rather than judicial
proceedings.275  Cohn was not controlling in the case because an
essential basis for the Cohn decision was the press's important role in
subjecting trials to public scrutiny and helping to guarantee their
fairness. 276 No such role was at issue in Florida Star because the rape
victim was identified at a time when there were no proceedings at
stake.277 The majority27 rested its opinion on the precedent set
forth in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.:279  "[I]f a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
270. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)).
271. 1& at 491-92.
272. Id at 496.
273. ldA
274. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
275. See i& at 527-28 (stating that the newspaper violated its own policy by publishing the
name of a sexual offense victim). The reporter for the Star who copied the information from
the report acknowledged at trial that there were signs posted in the room where he obtained
the report noting the names of rape victims were not matters of public record and were not to
be published. AL at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 532 (citing Cohn, 420 U.S. at 492-93).
277. Florida Star v. B.JF., 491 U.S. at 532.
278. See id at 542 (Scalia,J., concurring) (stating that no damages could be imposed on the
newspaper because the Florida statute was underinclusive: it did not prohibit dissemination of
such private news by individuals). Justice Scalia concluded that subjecting only the media to the
prohibition did not protect an "interest of the highest order," and therefore could not meet the
constitutional standard required. Id Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion in whichJustices
Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Id. at 542-53 (White, J., dissenting). His opinion will be
discussed at length below.
279. 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (holding unconstitutional the indictment of two newspapers
for violating a state statute forbidding newspapers to publish the name of any youth charged as
a juvenile offender without the juvenile court's written approval).
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significance[,] then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."2 ° There was no question in Florida
Star that the reporter had lawfully obtained the information, and
there was no issue as to the accuracy of the report.281 The question
the Court was faced with, then, was whether prohibiting the publica-
tion of a rape victim's name was furthering a "state interest of the
highest order."28 2  Given "the overarching 'public interest, secured
by the Constitution in the dissemination of truth,"'"8" the Court
ultimately concluded that the Florida statute did not reflect such a
state interest.28
4
The majority discussed three distinct reasons why the First
Amendment principle articulated in Daily Maifta should be sup-
ported.286 First, the Court pointed out that under the Daily Mail
principle, governments retain ample means of safeguarding significant
privacy interests by keeping such information from the public and
imposing damages on those officials who, through mishandling, allow
the release of such information.287 Second, the Court explained
that punishing the press for publication of information that is already
available to the public would not protect privacy interests.21 Finally,
the Court expressed its concern about "'timidity and self-censorship'
that might result from allowing the media to be punished for
publishing certain truthful information."289 Noting the Cohn Court
was concerned about the context of official court records, the Court
280. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979)).
281. Id. at 536.
282. Id. (stating that this case is appropriately analyzed with reference to the Daily Mail
standard).
283. Id. at 433 (quoting Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491).
284. Id. at 541.
285. 491 U.S. at 533 ("'[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the
information absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.'") (quoting Smith v.
Daily Mail, 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). But see id (White,J, dissenting) (questioning whether this
principle is really nothing more than a hypothesis offered by the Daily Mail Court). Given the
fact that this "principle" was introduced "with the cautious qualifier that such a rule was
'suggest[ed]' by... prior cases, '[n]one of [which] ... directly control[led]' in Daily Mai4" the
majority "should not be so uncritically accept[ing] [of Daily Mail] as constitutional dogma." Id.
at 545 (citing Daily Mai 443 U.S. at 103).
286. Id. at 534-36.
287. Id. at 534 ("Where information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means
than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination
of private facts.")
288. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989).
289. Id.
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stated that this self-censorship was also a legitimate concern for "other
information released, without qualification, by the government." 0'
Once it established that the Daily Mail principle was a legitimate
one, the majority applied the principle to the statute at hand. 91
First, the Court pointed out that the government's distribution of the
release can only convey the message that publication of the infor-
mation is not only lawful, but expected.292 Next, the Court took
issue with the statute's negligence per se standard, calling for a
reasonable person standard characteristic of the common law private
facts tort.293 Finally, the Court addressed the underinclusiveness of
the statute, explaining that it did not apply to the "backyard gossip
who tells fifty people."2 94 The majority ended its discussion in a
similar manner with which it began; it recognized the holding as
being limited to the circumstances at hand.2  The Court explicitly
did not answer the broad question left unresolved by Cohn: whether
truthful publications of private facts can ever be subject to civil or
criminal liability consistent with the First Amendment.2 6  Rather,
the Court held "only that where a newspaper publishes truthful
information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully
be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of
the highest order."297  Because the Florida statute at issue did not
serve such an interest, it could not be upheld.298
290. Id. at 536. The dissent took issue with the majority's position that the information at
hand was in fact released without qualification given the statute and given the signs posted in
the room in which the information was made available. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 536.
292. Horida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. at 538-39.
293. Id. at 539 (discussing how under the theory of negligence, liability automatically results
from publication and, unlike common law torts, there is no requirement that the disclosure
about an individual's personal life be highly offensive to a reasonable person). The dissent
pointed out that in this case, the jury found the Star had acted with reckless indifference, a
standard far higher than ordinary negligence, the standard urged. Id. at 548 (White, J.,
dissenting).
294. Id. at 540 (citing BJ.F.'s acknowledgment at oral argument and stating that the statute
does not protect against disclosure of information by means other than publication in an
"instrument of mass communication"). The dissent argued this problem was remedied by
Florida's recognition of the common law private facts tort, so that the gossip would be subject
to the same (or similar) liability as the Star. Id. at 550. (White, J., dissenting).
295. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,541 (1989). The Court commenced its opinion with
the recognition that its past decisions upholding the press' right to publish were resolved only
within each factual context. Id. at 530.
296. Id. (stating that the Court does not hold that truthful publication is automatically
protected by the Constitution or that there is no zone of personal privacy that the state can
protect from intrusion by the press).
297. Id. at 541.
298. Id, (holding that there is no state interest served by imposing liability).
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Cohn and Florida Star are important cases because they offer insight
on what type of material is considered public information 99 and
matters of public significance."00  However, it is important to
recognize that both decisions were couched in issues arising from the
freedom of the press since the defendants in both cases were
newspapers. When a doctor pursues a private facts claim against a
pro-life activist, freedom of the press is not at stake because private
speech is at issue; therefore, Cohn and Florida Star do not preclude a
doctor from bringing an invasion of privacy claim. This is especially
lucid given the careful holdings in each case limiting the decisions to
specific facts. 3 1 Regarding a doctor's potential private facts claim,
the importance of these cases lies in the Court's analysis of the
newsworthy defense, chiefly in regards to information contained in
public records. 2
The newsworthy defense will be an important factor to consider in
a doctor's private fact cause of action, because it will be the most
compelling argument against him or her. If the claim focuses on a
rap sheet type of wanted poster,0 3 the defense may be effective at
precluding the doctor's success. Malpractice suits and criminal
charges are not private facts because they are matters of public
record. 0 4 Given the unquestioned statement in Cohn,"°' which
was reiterated in Forida Star,306 that matters of public record pose
no threat to privacy interests because they are, by definition, part of
the public domain, a doctor will have a difficult time persuading a
299. Cox Broadcasting, Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (holding that once the
information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot
be held liable for publishing it).
300. Florida Starv. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524,539 (1989) (stating it is not unlawful for a newspaper
to print a rape victim's name when it is furnished by the government and when the matter is
one of public concern).
301. See id- (limiting the Court's holding to the facts of the case and refusing to hold that
all truthful publications are automatically protected under the Constitution); Cohn, 420 U.S. at
496-97 (holding that under the specific facts of the case, the state cannot impose liability under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments).
302. See supra notes 265-73 and accompanying text (discussing the Cohn Court's contention
of the importance of the press in disclosing public records to inform the public about the
administration of government); supra notes 280-84 and accompanying text (addressing the
Forida Star court's discussion of whether disclosure of truthful information already available to
the public furthers a state interest).
303. See Sherlock, supra note 14, A-1 (indicating that with this type of wanted poster, the
message is that the doctor is a negligent physician because of the number of malpractice suits
brought against him or her).
304. See, e.g., Sherlock, supra note 14, at 2-3 (asserting that criminal case files and lawsuit files
are public records which individuals have a right to view).
305. 420 U.S. 469, 495-96 (1975) (stating that once truthful information is in public docu-
ments, the press cannot be liable for publishing such information).
306. 491 U.S. 524,535 (1989) (contending that privacy interests are not protected by impos-
ing liability on the press for publication of information that is available to the public).
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court that his or her information should somehow be treated
differently. The burden is not an impossible one, however, given the
limited scope of the holdings in Cohn and Florida Star.
Both Cohn and Florida Star explicitly left open the broad
constitutional question of whether the media may ever be subject to
civil liability for publishing the truth."7  Instead, both decisions
focused on the facts at issue and clearly presented limited hol-
dings."'o In Cohn, the basic foundation for the decision regarding
the private facts tort was the important role the media played in
accurately reporting the proceedings and administration of the govern-
ment.3 9 The Court cited the need for such reporting so that
citizens may vote intelligently."' Especially important in Cohn was the
fact that the information in question was properly gathered in a
judicial proceeding."1 This fact was significant because of the
media's role in ensuring the fairness of trials.3 1 2 Furthermore, the
focus of Cohn was a criminal prosecution, and such a proceeding is
"without question" an event of legitimate public concern. 13
However, none of these issues are implicated in a situation that
involves doctors and pro-life activists. Successful malpractice suits are
of concern to potential patients, but they are immaterial in helping
citizens to vote intelligently and in insuring fair trials. Most wanted
posters cite civil suits that have been decided or long settled;
therefore, the adversarial proceedings deserving of public scrutiny are
307. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 491 (stating that the Court is addressing whether the state can impose
sanctions for the truthful publication of information obtained in judicial records and not
whether truthful publication can ever be subject to civil or criminal liability under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Forida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (asserting that this case does not hold
all truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected or that there is no zone of
privacy that the state can protect from invasion by the press).
308. Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496-97 (asserting that under the specific circumstances of the case,
liability will not be imposed); Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532 (stating that the "sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and privacy rights
counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context
of the instant case.").
309. 420 U.S. at 491-92.
310. Id at 492.
311. Id at 472 (explaining that the information was learned from an examination of the
indictments which were made available to reporters in the courtroom and were open to public
inspection).
312. Id. at 492 (discussing how the reporting of government proceedings by the press helps
guarantee the fairness of trials and brings the beneficial effects of public scrutiny on the
administration ofjustice).
313. Id. The Cohn Court explicitly held the topics of commissions of crimes, prosecutions
resulting from them, and judicial proceedings arising from those prosecutions to be "events of
legitimate concern to the public," and that the private facts tort probably would never be
successful against publications concerning these issues.
JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW
no longer at issue.1 4 Furthermore, the suits are civil suits, not
criminal cases, and are not per se a matter of public concern. They
are, however, relevant to the patients who are seeking an abortion
and potentially may be under the doctor's care. The problem with
the pro-life activists' publication of the suits is the use of inflammatory
words and choice of uncommon instances where an injury has
occurred. Furthermore, some of the suits may be based only on
allegations filed by the pro-life activists themselves.1 5
A doctor fighting a rap sheet will probably find it more difficult to
convince a court that malpractice suits and similar charges are not
newsworthy. However, if the claim focuses on the personal infor-
mation contained in a wanted poster, such as a doctor's picture,
name, address, and the like, then the arguments against the newswor-
thy defense are more compelling. First, a doctor's personal informa-
tion is irrelevant to the administration of the government, voting
intelligently, and fairness of trials. In addition, identifying doctors
who perform abortions simply is not a legitimate concern of the
public; it is the debate surrounding the issue of abortion that deserves
publicity."6
Moreover, it is unlikely that the Court had these wanted posters in
mind when it made its decisions in Cohn and Tofida Star. The Court
in F/orida Star stated that, by giving a news release, the government
not only considered the dissemination of the information lawful, it
expected the recipients to accurately report the information. ' Im-
plicit in this assertion is the idea that the recipients would merely
convert the release into a news story by "adding the linguistic
connecting tissue necessary to transform the report's facts into full
sentences."3 18 In the wanted posters and rap sheets, however, the
authors do much more than fill in the blanks with nouns and verbs
to form both subject and predicate. They add gruesome photo-
graphs319 and insert frenzied adjectives and adverbs to draw atten-
314. See generally Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6 (discussing the various lawsuits filed against
abortion providers).
315. SeeRochelle supra note 27 (discussing how pro-life organizations want to file malpractice
lawsuits against abortion providers but are having difficulty locating plaintiffs).
316. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 536-67 (1989) (alluding to this point, the Court
stated: "[T] he news article concerned a matter of public significance .... That is, the article
generally, as opposed to the specifJc identity contained within it, involved a matter of paramount public
import.... .") (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
317. Id. at 538-39.
318. Id. at 538-39.
319. See OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15 (instructing pro-life supporters to make posters
with pictures of aborted fetuses).
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tion to a private, law-abiding doctor.32° Therefore, the details
contained in the typical wanted poster should not be deemed
newsworthy information.
3. First Amendment Defense
The First Amendment defense is closely tied to the newsworthy
argument. The defendant is not asserting a constitutional right to
publish everything about the plaintiff; rather, the argument is that the
Constitution permits publicity about those subjects of public signifi-
cance. 321 However, on the other side of the argument is the plain-
tiffs right to privacy. The tension between the "right to be let
alone"3 22 and the right to free speech is clearly seen in a private
facts claim."
In circumstances where the Supreme Court has addressed the stress
between the right to privacy and the right to free speech, it has
upheld the publicity in favor of the First Amendment.24 However,
it is critical to note that the Court has been careful to emphasize that
each decision applied only to the discrete factual context.32
Therefore, one cannot make a blanket statement that the right to free
speech will always outweigh the right to privacy.
320. See Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-1 (asserting that pro-life individuals who make flyers
should use "short, active, and disgusting verbs and adjectives to get [the flyer's] message
across").
321. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-96 (1975) (discussing the clash
between right to privacy claims and First Amendment rights. The Court held that under the
First Amendment there is no liability for printing information that was available to the public
and that was of public concern.).
322. Warren and Brandeis, supranote 94, at 194 (discussing how the press invades the sacred
precinct of privacy and domestic life).
323. See Zimmerman, supra note 261, at 299-300 (discussing how the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS, which is heavily relied upon by the courts, requires the plaintiff in a private facts
claim to demonstrate that the material is private and that the defendant disseminated the
information widely. If the defendant can show that there is a legitimate public interest in the
disclosure, he or she can defeat the claim.).
324. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that imposing liability on
a newspaper for publishing a rape victim's name violates the First Amendment); Smith v. Daily
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104-06 (1979) (holding that a statute which makes it illegal to
publish alleged juvenile delinquent's names in violation of the First Amendment); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 496, 469 (1975) (holding that it is a violation of the First
Amendment to impose liability on a broadcast company for disclosing a rape victim's identity).
325. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524,530 (contending that the Court's holding is limited to
the specific facts of the case. The Court discusses that, although the Supreme Court has
continuously upheld the press' right to publish over the right to privacy, it has emphasized in
each case that it was "resolving this conflict only as it arose in a discrete factual context."); Smith
v. Daily Mail Publishing, 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (stating that the Court's holding only applies to
whether a newspaper can publish ajuvenile delinquent's name which the newspaper lawfully ob-
tained); Cohn, 420 U.S. at 496 (stating that according to the specific circumstances of the case,
imposing liability would be a violation of the First Amendment).
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There are few bright-line rules in this area, but at least one general
principle can be gleaned from the Supreme Court cases: the
publication of truthful information about a matter of legitimate public
concern constitutionally may not be punished, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order.32 This premise will be
applied in a private facts claim only if one key element is not met;
that is, the information in question is in fact a matter of public
significance. 27 As argued above, details of a doctor's life publicized
on a wanted poster are not matters of interest to the general
public.328 However, even if the information is a matter of public
significance, a doctor may still be successful if he or she can prove
that a state interest of the highest order is furthered. 29
Given the increasing amount of violence in the anti-abortion
movement,3" especially the current trend targeting doctors, some
courts may in fact recognize the state's interest in protecting a
doctor's safety in order to ensure reproductive freedom. One major
criticism of the private facts tort is that a fear of publicity should not
be enough to restrict free speech.3 This argument is a superficial
one, overlooking the important constitutional significance of
privacy-both a doctor's right to be left alone and a woman's right
to choose to have an abortion. Moreover, in this particular situation,
a doctor's safety is at stake, not simply embarrassment or humiliation.
The state has a significant interest in protecting its citizens332 and
326. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541 (holding that, under the facts of the case, there is no
state interest in imposing liability); Daily MailPublishing Co., 443 U.S. at 104 (holding the state's
interest is not sufficient to justify imposing liability).
327. See Zimmerman, supra note 261, at 320-24.
328. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing that the personal details of a
doctor's life are of no interest to the general public).
329. See Daily Mail Publishing, Co., 443 U.S. at 103 (asserting that the publication of truthful
information can be sanctioned even if the information is lawfully obtained and is of public
significance, if there is "a need to further an interest of the highest order").
330. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing the increase in abortion-related
violence since 1993).
331. See Zimmerman, supra note 261, at 337 (arguing that "[a] serious effort to enforce a
general right to be free of unwanted publicity about private facts would probably be as successful
as the attempt to enforce temperance through the ill-fated Eighteenth Amendment, or the effort
to use the law to prevent extramarital sexual encounters.").
332. See, e.g., Ash v. New York University Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec.
27, 1990) (discussing the state's interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens); Harry T.
Edwards and Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating iolence in Television, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 1487, 1535
(1995) (stating that Congress would likely contend to ban violence on television, that the state
has an interest in protecting the lives and property of its citizens from violent, anti-social
behavior);Jessica M. Karner, Political Speech, Sexual Harassment and a Captive Work Place, 83 CAL.
L. REv. 637, 669 (1995) (discussing how the court in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)
upheld an ordinance prohibiting loud trucks from blasting noise in residential neighborhoods,
and based its holding on the state's interest in protecting its citizens);Jon S. Lerner, Protecting
Home Schooling Through the Casey Undue Burden Standards, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 363 (1995) (asserting
that the state has an interest in protecting children and in regulating home schooling).
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it should be respected through the protection of a doctor's right to
privacy.
In dicta, the Court in Florida Star stated that there may be situations
when truthful publication can be punished consistent with the First
Amendment, noting "that the future may bring scenarios which
prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily."" 3 In addition,
the Court did not completely rule out the possibility that public
information may still be restricted: "[there] is a limited set of cases
... where, despite the accessibility of the public to certain infor-
mation, a meaningful public interest is served by restricting its further
release by other entities, like the press.
"33
The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment is not
absolute.335 As the public interest in the information decreases, it
can be argued that the First Amendment interest decreases, especially
when balanced against a significant constitutional interest like the
right to privacy. Just as "interests in privacy fade when the infor-
mation involved already appears on the public record,"336 the
opposite should be true: interests in privacy expand when the matter
in question is kept confidential. Because many doctors fervently try
to keep their personal material undisclosed, the privacy interests
involved increase to full constitutional proportions. As previously
argued, there is little public interest in the doctor's personal informa-
tion,33 7 so the interests in free speech are lessened. Therefore,
when balanced against a pro-life activist's right to free speech, a
doctor's privacy interests should prevail.
CONCLUSION
As of 1988, eighty-three percent of United States counties had no
identified abortion provider.3 s  The basic cause behind the low
numbers of doctors performing abortions is that more doctors are
leaving the field than are entering it."39 Two grounds have been
cited for this phenomenon. First, doctors are retiring faster than
333. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
334. I& at 535 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
335. Masson v. NewYorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (discussing that the First
Amendment does not give absolute protection to a writer who altered a psychoanalyst's
statement in a magazine article and book).
336. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975).
337. See supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing that individual doctors' private
lives are not matters of public concern).
338. Grimes, supra note 125, at 719.
339. Grimes, supra note 125, at 720.
409
410 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:361
younger doctors are being trained to perform the service,"4 and
secondly, doctors are prematurely leaving the field due to dissatis-
faction.3 41  Besides the low pay42 and the poor conditions,3 43
one major reason behind the discontent is harassment.3 4 Threats
of intimidation not only cause early abandonment of the practice,3 45
such tactics also discourage young medical graduates from joining the
field. 46
Recently, the harassment of doctors has become more intense.
Doctors are not only specifically targeted for intimidation, they are
more frequently becoming the victims of violent acts resulting in
injury and death. 47 It is true that not all pro-life advocates condone
this behavior,3' but the militant activists have created a climate of
fear among doctors who perform abortions . 49 In order to preserve
these doctors' safety and the right of a woman to choose an abortion,
this behavior should be stopped at the early stages of harassment.
Typically, the intimidation of doctors begins with an exposure
campaign, aimed at informing the community that a particular doctor
performs abortions. 30  The underlying theory behind this new
340. Grimes, supra note 125, at 720 (discussing how many of the older clinicians were
motivated by their concern for patients who were killed by illegal abortion and explaining that
younger clinicians who have not had similar experiences may lack the personal commitment of
the older clinicians).
341. Grimes, supra note 125, at 720-21.
342. Grimes, supra note 125, at 721 (asserting that since the cost of abortion is fairly low and
has not increased with inflation, performing abortions does not generate much income for
clinicians).
343. Grimes, supra note 125, at 721 (discussing how abortion underutilizes the clinician's
skills. The presence of abortion counselors and nurse practitioners, in addition to the rapid flow
of patients in clinics, all have depersonalized "the abortion experience" for the clinician since
communication with the patient may be very limited.).
344. Grimes, supra note 125, at 721 (stating that harassment of abortion providers has taken
many different forms, ranging from picketing of doctors' homes and offices to death threats).
345. See, Grimes, supra note 125, at 721 (asserting that harassment can result in a clinician's
loss of hospital privileges and close scrutiny by state licensing boards because of the nature of
the abortion practice); Let Feds Use Their Power on Anti-Abortion Extremists, DAYrON DAILY NEWS,
Aug. 18, 1994, at A14 (stating that fewer doctors are willing to endure the harassment and
threats which often accompany the performing of abortions).
346. See Morning Edition, supra note 1 (discussing that fewer medical students are being
trained to perform abortions).
347. See Bumpus-Hooper, supra note 2 (discussing violence against doctors who provide
abortions).
348. See Morning Edition, supra note 1 (relating Helen Alvare's (of the National Council of
Catholic Bishops) notion that the recent violence toward abortion clinics is not what the pro-life
movement is truly about). Tim Poor, Abortion-Rights Supporters Want Action on Extremists, ST.
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH,July 31, 1994, at A5 (quoting the National Right to Life Committee, Inc.
as saying the killing of doctors who perform abortion is "deplorable and reprehensible .. ").
349. See MorningEdition, supra note 1 (stating that because of the increase in violence against
abortion clinics some doctors no longer will perform abortions).
350. See, e.g., Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-6 to 10-15 (discussing the various ways to notify
the community about doctors performing abortions).
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trend is to make abortion unavailable by forcing doctors to stop
providing abortion services. 35' These exposure campaigns consist
primarily of picketing the doctor's home and exposing him or her
through publicity, usually in the form of some type of wanted
poster.52 Contained in these signs are both truthful and false
information, coupled with inflammatory language and gruesome
photographs. 5 3 As such, these posters are sometimes the begin-
nings of a violent pattern of behavior aimed at a particular doctor in
an effort to force him or her out of the field.' 4 Often they cause
enough hardship that a doctor simply can no longer endure the
intimidation.355  Either way, the end result is the same: one less
doctor to provide abortions. If a doctor could stop this harassment,
perhaps the violence that sometimes follows would be curbed as well.
Unfortunately, the current law offers little in the form of preventative
measures; therefore, the law needs to recognize the necessity of
privacy protection for these doctors.
Three potential claims have been analyzed in this Comment, all
based on a broader assertion of invasion of privacy. Intrusion upon
seclusion, false light, and the public disclosure of private facts are all
viable claims that could be brought by a doctor against pro-life
activists. At the heart of each of these claims is a tension between a
fundamental right of the doctor to be left alone and the pro-life
activist's right to free speech. In the past, the balance has tipped in
favor of the First Amendment.156  However, given the potential
gravity of the situation and the lack of other possible avenues in this
area, a court should seriously consider the invasion of privacy torts as
significant causes of action for doctors.
351. See e.g. Sherlock, supra note 14, at 10-6 (asserting that if the community knew about the
doctors who perform abortion, they could put them out of business).
352. See, e.g., OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15 (instructing pro-life supporters to contact
the media, create flyers and posters, and picket the homes of doctors who perform abortions).
353. See infra, Appendices A and B (describing the tactics used to target doctors who perform
abortions).
354. See Let Feds Use Their Power on Anti-Abortion Extremists, supra note 345, at A14 (stating that
harassment and threats to doctors who perform abortions have caused fewer doctors to remain
in the abortion practice).
355. Sandra Torry, Physicians Seek Federal Court Protection from Abortion Protestors, WASH. POST,
Oct. 27, 1995 at A5.
356. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that the facts of the case
require the newspaper's First Amendment rights to outweigh a rape victim's privacy rights);
Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing, Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104 (1979) (asserting that the state interest in
protecting the anonymity of a juvenile offender is outweighed by the newspaper's First
Amendment right to publish lawfully obtained information); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (stating that, in terms of the First and Fourteenth Amendments,
privacy rights fade when information is already in the public record).
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If the harassment continues, the medical field will continually be
less capable of providing abortion services. The right to choose an
abortion is a constitutional right, 57 and it must be safeguarded
properly. We must offer doctors some form of privacy protection,
otherwise reproductive freedom will no longer be a reality, but merely
a legal ideal.
APPENDIX A-EXCERPTS FROM THE MODEL EXPOSE FLYER IN
ABORTION BUSTER'S MANUAL
In bold letters at the top are the words ARE YOU SAFE?... The
text begins with: "Serious injuries to female organs. Abortions done
on non-pregnant women. Women so damaged they have not been
able to have sex. WOMEN DYING OR NEARLY BLEEDING TO
DEATH AFTER ABORTIONS... [This] is what women said hap-
pened to them when the doctors of [a clinic] operated on them in
recent years!" 59
The next section of the flyer details gruesome allegations made
against these doctors and describe stories of four women who died
after undergoing abortions at this clinic.
A woman sued Dr. [X], saying she had to get two abortions-
several weeks apart-to kill the same child .... Hospital [Z] was
the last stop for a 16-year-old girl in 1984. Dr. [X] couldn't get all
of an aborted baby out of her womb on the first try, so he set her
aside for several hours before trying again. She died in the
operating room. The coroner's autopsy report on her said her
vagina contained 'a collection of catgut sutures .... ' A woman
checked into Hospital [Y] for an abortion just before Christmas in
1984; she didn't come out alive. She kept bleeding after the
abortion, so one of the doctors did a hysterectomy on her. This
didn't work; she went into shock and bled to death. .... 360
The flyer ends with several questions aimed at making the reader
think twice about abortions.36 1
These items raise serious question about Dr. [X] and Hospital [Z].
WHY do Dr. [X] and his staff doctors get sued so often? WHY do
they try to do abortions in five minutes or less? Don't they care
about women's health? In fact, WHY should women risk going to
357. SeeRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a statute prohibiting abortion except
to save the mother's life is unconstitutional).
358. See Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6. This flyer was printed as an example of how pro-life
supporters target doctors who perform abortion).
359. Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6.
360. Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6.
361. Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6.
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ANY abortion clinic? Abortionists get BIG money for abortions. It
is in their interests not to inform women the surgery involves risk,
the children they are carrying are human beings who can feel pain,
and there are alternatives. And all too often, the staffers at these
high-volume abortion business RUSH women thru [sic] surgery.
The results aren't pretty. If you are pregnant and are considering
abortion, ask yourself this question: Do Hospital [Z] staffers care
about me, or do they care only about the money they will get from
the abortion of my child?5 2
APPENDIX B-THE TYPICAL WANTED POSTER
Based on the approaches described in the Abortion Buster's Manual,
Operation No Place to Hide, Firestorm and the author's personal
experiences as a clinic escort, a typical wanted poster contains certain
key information and language. Common phrases include "Dr. X kills
seven-month old babies every day," 'Your neighbor is a killer for
profit," "WANTED: Dr. X for killing babies. Estimated to have killed
120,000 babies-nearly enough people to populate Huntington
Beach," 63 "This man is extremely dangerous to unborn babies!!!
Write him and ask him to stop killing innocent babies."' 64
REWARD of $5000 for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of this killer. A baby killer lives in your neighborhood
and participates in the American Holocaust everyday. Unfor-
tunately there is no Oskar Schindier for the millions of incon-
venient people being slaughtered. Please don't look the other way
.... You may be the next hero to save these people from exter-
mination, and this man is wanted for crimes against humanity. He
has butchered and dismembered thousands of little children for
profitse
Along with these remarks are usually a picture of the doctor, his or
her name, address, phone number, and places she or he frequents
(such as restaurants and banks). Many posters also have pictures of
aborted fetuses or decapitated children or other gruesome
photographs with captions like "death by total dismemberment" 66
or "this doctor believes in freedom of choice-the choice to mutilate
babies."
362. Sherlock, supra note 14, at A-6.
363. OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15. See, e.g., Van Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005,
1007 (Ill. App. 1988) (discussing how the posters targeted at the plaintiff, an Executive Director
of an abortion clinic, contained pictures of aborted fetuses).
364. OR's No Place to Hide, supra note 15.
365. The above quotations from wanted posters are based on posters the author saw while
volunteering as a clinic escort.
366. SeeVan Duyn v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 (I1. App. 1988) (describing a "Face the
American Holocaust' poster).
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APPENDIX C--JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE"
We, the undersigned, declare the justice of taking all godly action
necessary to defend innocent human life including the use of force.
We proclaim that whatever force is legitimate to defend the life of a
born child is legitimate to defend the life of an unborn child. We
assert that if Michael Griffin did in fact kill David Gunn, his use of
lethal force was justifiable provided it was carried out for the purpose
of defending the lives of unborn children. Therefore, he ought to be
acquitted of the charges against him. 67
The document was written by Paul Hill and included the signatures
of twenty-five activists as of early 1993. Since Paul Hill's conviction,
several more individuals have signed the document. It is important
to note that several activists who signed the document were pastors
and priests, and at least one attorney has signed the document as
well.3
68
367. Defensive Action, DEFENSIVE ACTION PRESS (April 1993).
368. Id.
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